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THE  UNPOPULAR  HISTORY 
OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 


THE 

UNPOPULAR  HISTORY 

OF   THE    UNITED    STATES 
BY  UNCLE  SAM  HIMSELF 

AS  RECORDED  IN   UNCLE   SAM'S  OWN  WORDS 
BY 

HARRIS  DICKSON 


NEW  YORK 

FREDERICK  A.  STOKES  COMPANY 
PUBLISHERS 


Copyright,  1917,  by 
FREDERICK  A.  STOKES  COMPANY 

AU  rights  reserved 


Printed  in  the  United  States  of  Americ 


FOEEWOED 

THIS  is  not  a  piece  of  literature,  but  merely 
the  straightforward  heart-to-heart  talk  of  one 
American  with  other  Americans.  In  the  ulti- 
mate we  all  love  the  truth,  and  dare  to  face 
it.  This  is  the  truth  as  believed,  and  now 
acted  upon  by  the  best  minds  in  our  coun- 
try. 

It  was  prepared  in  Washington  City  when 
our  capital  was  one  of  the  most  picturesque 
and  busy  in  the  world.  Khaki  lads  line  the 
streets ;  officers  come  and  go  upon  their  silent 
errands.  Distinguished  commissions  from 
our  allies  hold  daily  conference  with  Ameri- 
can officials,  welding  our  joint  resources,  and 
warning  us  against  their  errors. 

Thousands  of  private  citizens — able,  self- 
sacrificing,  patriotic  men — have  flocked  to 
Washington,  placing  their  talents  at  the  na- 
tion's disposal.  They  are  not  glory  seekers, 
[v] 


Foreword 


Few  of  their  names  are  known.    They  only 
ask  to  serve;  and  they  do  serve — efficiently. 

The  net  effect  produced  upon  me — and  this 
is  what  I  want  to  tell  you — is  that  things  are 
being  done,  excellently  well  done.  From  our 
manifold  insufficiencies  we  have  learned. 

This  is  intended  not  as  a  slur,  but  as  a 
spur  for  us  to  do  what  the  United  States  can 
surely  do,  when  once  our  people  become 
aroused.  The  United  States  needs  our  best, 
humanity  needs  it ;  ,nor  shall  we  be  weighed 
in  the  balance  and  found  wanting. 

HABEIS  DICKSOK. 

Washington,  D.  C., 
July  4th,  1917. 


[vi] 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTEB  PACK 

FOREWORD v 

INTRODUCTION  ix 

I    UNCLE  SAM  GETS  STARTED      .         .       1 

II     UNCLE  SAM  KEEPS  GOING      .         .       6 

III  THE  FICTION  OF  INVINCIBLE  MILITIA   12 

IV  THE  RUSH  THAT  NEVER  RUSHED     .     17 
V    WHAT  THE  SHORT-TERM  MILITIA  Dm    24 

VI    PESTERING  FATHER  WITH  POP-CALLS    30 

VII     THE  RUNNING  MILITIA  .         .         .36 

VIII     A  STRANGER  COMES        .         .         .42 

IX     THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  DISASTER  .     47 

X     THE  LITTLE  WE  LEARNED  AND  THE 

MUCH  WE  DIDN'T  .         .         .54 

XI    Lo,  THE  IMPOLITE  INDIAN        .         .     60 

XII     GEORGE'S  PET        .         .         .         .67 

XIII  "ON  TO  CANADA!"        .         .         .74 

XIV  THE  PRAIRIE  FIRE  PANIC        .         .     80 
XV     THE  TIN  HORN  DEFENSE        .         .     90 

XVI     UNCLE  SAM  COUNTS  THE  COST        .     98 

XVII     MORE  FIGHTS  FOR  PEACEFUL  FOLK  102 

XVIII     A  LONESOME  GENERAL  .         .         .107 

XIX     THE  MEXICAN  PARADOX         .         .  Ill 

XX     ADVANCE,   HALT,  AND   GENTLEMEN 

CHANGE 119 

[vii] 


Contents 

CHAPTEB  PAGE 

XXI     OPENING  THE  CIVIL  WAR        .         .  124 

XXII    WHAT  OF  THE  REGULARS?       .          .  130 

XXIII  THE  CONFEDERACY  FIRST  SEES  THE 

LIGHT 136 

XXIV  DEMAGOGUES  AND  DISSENSION         .  141 
XXV     To  OUR  MISTAUGHT  MILLIONS         .  147 

XXVI     THE  WORK  OF  WARSMITHS      .         .  155 

THE  UNPOPULAR  HISTORY                .  161 


[viii] 


INTRODUCTION 

FOR  three  years  the  world  has  been  talking 
about  war.  So  has  Uncle  Sam.  Everybody 
listens.  So  do  I.  Yet,  while  listening  with 
both  ears,  I  fail  to  comprehend.  I  know  ab- 
solutely nothing  of  military  science.  Do  you? 

Highly  specialized  officers  have  explained 
to  me  the  object  of  certain  mass  formations, 
problems  of  range  and  parabola,  and  remain- 
ing velocities.  All  of  which  goes  right  over 
my  head.  War  news  and  technical  discus- 
sions produce  little  or  no  effect  upon  me  ex- 
cept that  of  helpless  horror.  And  that  is  how 
the  average  American  feels,  although  dimly 
realizing  that  the  life  or  death  of  his  coun- 
try, and  of  world-wide  republican  institu- 
tions, hang  in  the  balance.  The  average 
American  is  eager  and  anxious  to  know,  so 
he  can  do  something,  and  do  it  well. 

Our  Uncle  Sam,  being  a  plain-spoken  and 
[ix] 


Introduction 


practical  person,  admits  that  he  generally 
makes  a  muss  of  soldiering,  and  has  set  his 
head  to  find  out  why.  Uncle  Sam  has  been 
lying  awake  at  nights  ruminating  over  the 
salty  facts.  Having  learned  better,  he  does 
better.  He  is  doing  much  better  now,  and 
means  to  get  ahead  of  the  best  before  he 
plows  this  furrow  to  the  end.  Uncle  Sam 
can  accomplish  whatever  he  tries,  and,  be- 
lieve me,  he  is  trying. 

But  he  needs  help,  help  from  you  and  help 
from  me,  from  every  loyal  citizen  in  the 
United  States.  Therefore  Uncle  Sam  desires 
that  all  of  us  should  consider  what  has  gone 
wrong  in  the  past,  so  that  we  may  avoid  the 
same  blunders  in  the  future.  Just  now  we 
have  the  errors  of  our  allies  to  warn  us,  and 
no  legislator  with  mule  sense  should  set  his 
foot  in  a  hole  when  there  is  a  sign  board 
standing  right  before  his  nose  to  point  it  out. 

The  average  American  does  not  understand 
war.  This  present  affair  is  so  prodigious  that 
it  passes  beyond  his  mental  jurisdiction.  As 
for  myself,  martial  science  must  be  reduced 


Introduction 


to  words  of  one  syllable,  or  I  don't  get  it. 

It  goes  against  the  grain  to  accept  state- 
ments that  we  hate  to  believe,  facts  that  jostle 
ns  out  of  pet  notions  which  are  the  pride  and 
heritage  of  every  school  boy.  Patriotic  speak- 
ers are  constantly  declaiming  "Paul  Ee- 
vere,"  "Ring  Out  for  Liberty"  and  "Bar- 
bara Frietchie,"  but  never  disturb  the  fakes 
and  the  fabrications. 

I  was  a  grown  man,  thirty  years  old,  strug- 
gling to  hoe  off  my  beard  with  a  safety  razor, 
before  it  dawned  upon  me  that  the  military 
history  of  my  country  had  not  been  one  long 
unbroken  series  of  Star  Spangled  victories. 
Like  all  other  school  boys  I  had  been  fed  up 
on  4th  of  July  orations.  I  believed  in  fairies, 
in  Jack  the  Giant  Killer,  in  the  Boys  of  '76. 
I  almost  believed  that  a  lone  and  gray-haired 
farmer  with  a  fife,  and  a  bloody  rag  around 
his  head,  flanked  by  two  small  drummer  boys, 
had  chased  the  British  army  from  off  our 
sacred  continent.  I  half-way  believed  that. 
Did  you? 

The  truth  is  that  Uncle  Sam  has  abandoned 
[xi] 


Introduction 


the  precarious  system  of  volunteer  militia, 
which  was  born  with  this  republic,  and  adopt- 
ed the  essentially  democratic  principle  that 
national  defense  is  the  paramount  duty  of 
every  citizen.  Defense  of  the  republic — like 
taxes  and  jury  duty — constitutes  an  obliga- 
tion that  cannot  be  laid  upon  the  backs  of  a 
few  willing  horses  who  would  be  ridden  to 
death.  All  must  serve  their  turn ;  each  must 
do  his  bit. 

This  fair  and  equal  method  has  been  put  in 
operation.  It  is  working  well,  so  well  that  we 
Americans,  without  too  greatly  shocking  our 
national  pride,  can  now  turn  back  to  the  dis- 
cards and  discuss  the  reasons. 

Patriotic  school  histories  teach  us  that  we 
have  been  victorious  in  all  our  wars.  Millions 
of  intelligent  men  accept  these  statements, 
stand  convinced  of  our  natural  prowess,  and 
see  no  cause  for  changing  a  method  under 
which  we  have  apparently  achieved  success. 
But  the  present  war  has  overturned  all 
theories,  established  new  standards,  and  the 
triumph  of  yesterday  becomes  the  inevitable 
[xii] 


Introduction 


failure  of  to-day.  To  provide  against  the  pos- 
sibility of  failure  Uncle  Sam  now  pursues 
the  most  business-like  plan  of  organizing  and 
employing  his  enormous  potential  strength. 
Things  are  being  done,  in  "Washington  and 
throughout  the  country,  competently  done, 
to  build  an  army  from  the  bottom  up,  and  of 
magnificent  material.  They  are  doing  what 
has  never  been  done  before,  training  forty 
thousand  officers — forty  thousand  youngsters 
who  throw  into  their  work  every  faculty  of 
nerve  and  brain  and  sinew  that  they  possess. 
"Whatever  men  may  accomplish,  that  accom- 
plishment will  be  theirs;  of  that  the  nation 
can  rest  assured.  Yet  the  bulk  of  our  people, 
no  matter  how  wise  and  patriotic,  are  unedu- 
cated in  military  details.  The  grim  facts 
of  our  blunders  may  startle  you  as  they 
startled  me.  You  may  be  incredulous,  just  as 
I  refused  to  believe.  Bear  this  in  mind :  No 
statement  is  herein  made  except  upon  au- 
thority of  Brevet  Major-General  Emory  Up- 
ton, as  contained  in  his  "Military  Policy  of 
the  United  States."  These  are  no  hostile 
[xiii] 


Introduction 


slanders  to  be  resented  and  refuted,  but  are 
expressly  endorsed  by  our  own  government, 
and  furnish  the  most  potent  reasons  for  cast- 
ing aside  the  volunteer  system  so  prolific  of 
disaster. 

Each  detail  might  be  verified  by  page  refer- 
ences to  General  Upton 's  work,  but  it  is  con- 
sidered better  not  to  confuse  and  complicate 
so  brief  a  'synopsis. 

For  the  purpose  of  further  informing  the 
people  as  to  this  radical  change  of  their  mili- 
tary, system,  Uncle  Sam  has  given  me  his  rea- 
sons in  language  so  simple  and  direct  that 
even  you  and  I  may  understand. 


[xiv] 


UNCLE  SAM  GETS  STAETED 

Now,  my  son — Uncle  Sam  rolled  up  Ms 
sleeves  and  started — sit  down  and  plug  away 
on  that  typewriter  while  I  talk.  Make  your 
machine  rattle  the  same  as  chickens  picking 
corn  off  a  tin  roof.  I'm  a  right  tolerable 
long-winded  windmill,  and  sizzling  with 
things  that  must  be  got  out  of  my  system. 

The  woods  are  full  of  folks — and  the  cities, 
too — full  of  good  folks  who  don't  realize  that 
[1] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

we  are  having  a  war,  a  strictly  business  war 
that  will  spare  no  home  in  the  land.  They 
must  realize  it,  and  realize  it  right  now.  I  Ve 
got  a  job  for  every  man,  woman  and  child  in 
America,  a  job  to  be  learned  and  done — ef- 
ficiently. 

They  don't  see  it  yet.  They  have  got  the 
notion  that  nobody  dares  tackle  them,  that  we 
are  some  punkins  in  a  scrap,  and  can  whip 
both  sets  of  allies  in  our  spare  time,  say,  be- 
tween breakfast  and  dinner,  which  makes  a 
fellow  strut  and  feel  good,  but  lays  him  liable 
to  a  jolt. 

Our  folks  have  been  thinking  it  was  not 
necessary  for  us  to  do  anything,  and  of  course 
Congress  trailed  along  behind.  That  is  why 
nothing  had  been  done  up  to  a  year  ago.  But 
the  people  are  waking  up,  and  putting  alarm 
clocks  under  Congress.  Mind  you  I  am  not 
blaming  anybody  in  particular.  I  am  just 
saying  what's  what. 

Our  people  don't  know  because  they  have 
not  been  told  at  all,  or  been  told  wrong,  and 
that's  the  main  trouble.  School  books  teach 
[2] 


Uncle  Sam  Gets  Started 


our  children  that  we  have  won  all  of  our  wars, 
just  as  easy  as  falling  off  a  log,  and  if  a  for- 
eign army  invaded  America,  grandfather 
would  reach  around,  get  his  scythe  blade,  and 
clean  'em  up. 

One  time  I  knew  a  justice  of  the  peace  to 
be  elected  on  the  platform  that  he  could  take 
a  lightning  bug,  on  the  end  of  a  corn  cob,  and 
bluff  the  machine-made  armies  of  Europe  into 
the  Atlantic  Ocean.  Maybe  he  could.  But 
machine-made  armies  won't  fight  with  corn 
cobs  and  lightning  bugs.  Rules  have  changed. 

Plenty  of  grown  men  believe  that  still.  It 
is  part  of  public  opinion,  and  helps  to  shape 
the  policy  of  this  nation. 

Some  of  these  days  I  am  going  to  jump  on 
those  " popular  school  histories"  and  put 
them  out  of  business.  Publishers  print  'em 
to  make  money,  and  folks  won't  pay  good 
money  for  medicine  that  tastes  bad.  Just  call 
this  the  ''Unpopular  History,"  and  maybe 
we  can 't  give  it  away.  But  I  want  to  tell  the 
truth  to  every  fifteen-year-old  boy  in  the 
United  States,  want  to  make  every  member 
[3] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

of  Congress  read,  mark,  learn  and  inwardly 
digest  it. 

Listen,  my  son,  listen  to  a  plain  talk, 
straight  from  the  shoulder. 

We  Americans  love  bunk.  I  know  what  I 
am  talking  about.  We  do  love  bunk.  We  just 
nationally  eat  it  up — a  stuff  that's  not  too 
bright  or  good  for  Yankee  nature's  daily 
food.  Of  all  the  bunk  that  we  are  fed  upon, 
none  is  grabbed  more  greedily  than  the  4th 
of  July  oration  about  our  fighting  citizenship, 
and  a  rush  to  arms.  We  are  the  fighting 
citizenship ;  we  are  the  patriotic  rushers.  We 
are  the  original  patentees,  progenitors,  and 
extemporaneous  guardians  of  freedom!  We 
are  IT! 

Nothing  tickles  our  American  vanity  so 
much  as  being  patted  on  the  back  for  natural 
born  warriors  who  can  lick  the  world  just  for 
pastime.  The  perspiring  4th  of  July  orator 
pumps  us  full  of  heroic  hot  air,  which  pleas- 
ingly distends  our  hides  with  manhood,  and 
we  elect  the  orator  to  Congress.  He  goes  to 
Congress  on  that  platform,  and  sticks  by  it — 
[4] 


Uncle  Sam  Gets  Started 


which  is  good  politics.  Poets  sing  of  trium- 
phant liberty  and  school  books  teach  of  ty- 
rants trembling  before  the  musketry  of  em- 
battled farmers.  Thereupon  the  spectacled 
historian  comes  along  to  clinch  these  patri- 
otic fakes  with  unassailable  statistics.  All  of 
which  is  strictly  for  home  consumption.  Ex- 
ported bunk  does  not  pass  at  par.  Soldiers 
beyond  the  seas  know  a  darn  sight  better,  and 
they'll  show  us  better  if  we  don't  wake  up. 


[5] 


II 

UNCLE  SAM  KEEPS  GOING 

THIS  bluster  and  brag  about  licking  the 
world  with  both  hands  tied  behind  us  is  the 
most  dangerous  sort  of  bunk.  Every  chan- 
cellery in  Europe  smiles  at  it. 

Suppose  we  start  at  the  very  beginning. 
To  the  forefathers  of  this  republic  a  standing 
army  typified  all  the  oppression  from  which 
they  had  escaped.  Professional  soldiers  to 
them  represented  the  pomp  of  dynasties  and 
[6] 


Uncle  Sam  Keeps  Going 


the  pride  of  kings,  a  class  apart  from,  and 
antagonistic  to,  the  people — a  class  that 
marched  at  the  nod  of  tyrannical  monarchs. 
None  of  that  for  us  in  free  America. 

We  built  our  military  fabric  upon  an  en- 
tirely different  theory — a  small  standing 
army  to  be  used  as  a  nucleus  around  which 
the  aforesaid  fighting  citizenship  would  rally. 
We  believed  implicitly  in  the  volunteer.  Up 
to  the  passage  of  our  present  selective  draft 
law,  we  figured  that  our  ranks  would  be 
crowded  with  youngsters  who  were  craving 
to  fight. 

Now  we  have  the  selective  draft  upon  our 
statute  books,  but  no  law  gets  full  force  and 
effect  unless  the  people  understand  and  ap- 
prove. We  have  changed  our  entire  military 
system  because  we  had  started  wrong,  and  the 
people  ought  to  know  why. 

At  the  beginning  we  planned  that  a  small 
body  of  volunteers  should  constitute  our  regu- 
lar army ;  the  balance,  held  as  a  reserve  force 
or  militia,  remaining  under  control  of  the 
states.  Militiamen  and  officers  alike  are  gen- 
[7] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

erally  untrained,  the  officers  being  popular 
fellows  elected  by  their  comrades  and  com- 
missioned by  the  Government. 

I  am  not  saying  a  word  against  these  volun- 
teers, the  finest  youngsters  that  ever  trod 
shoe  leather,  the  best  fighting  material  on 
earth.  But  no  matter  how  brave  and  patrio- 
tic the  individual  lad  may  be,  he  needs  long 
and  skillful  training. 

This,  my  son,  was  the  germ  of  our  military 
policy.  It  has  been  tried  for  more  than  a 
hundred  years,  in  assorted  wars,  foreign,  do- 
mestic, Indian.  Educated  military  men  got 
their  dose  of  it — by  the  painful  method — and 
say  it  is  the  worst  system  ever  devised.  But 
some  way  or  other  we  have  always  managed, 
by  main  strength  and  awkwardness,  to  scram- 
ble out  on  top,  which  has  made  folks  think 
that  as  a  nation  we  are  invincible.  My  son, 
the  very  surest  way  to  get  life  pummeled  out 
of  you  is  to  feel  that  there's  no  use  exerting 
yourself.  The  other  fellow  exerts  himself, 
and  it  is  all  over  but  the  ambulance. 

Did  you  ever  sit  out  in  front  of  a  cross- 
[8] 


Uncle  Sam  Keeps  Going 


roads  store  and  hear  the  boys  talk?  I  mean 
the  boys  with  whiskers,  whittling  on  a  dry- 
goods  box?  They  are  my  kind  of  folks.  I 
was  born  with  them,  reared  with  them.  I 
know  what  kind  of  flapjacks  his  wife  makes ; 
know  what  kind  of  water  he  has  in  his  well ; 
I  drink  out  of  the  same  gourd,  and  know  the 
name  of  his  dog.  I  deny  flatfootedly  that 
there  is  any  better  American  alive  than  the 
Iowa  farmer,  or  the  Virginia  farmer,  or  the 
Texas  farmer.  I  speak  his  language,  I  know 
what  he  is  thinking  about,  and  I  wish  I  could 
talk  to  him  face  to  face. 

Most  of  them  have  got  the  same  idea,  not 
only  the  boys  at  the  crossroads  store,  but 
business  men,  school  teachers,  lawyers.  Just 
hang  around  and  listen  to  what  they  say: 
"Look  what  we  did  to  the  British  in  the  Rev- 
olution— a  plenty."  "How  Old  Hickory 
cleaned  'em  up  at  New  Orleans. "  "  Over-ran 
Mexico  before  you  could  say  scat." 

"Of  course  those  foreign  governments  have 
big  armies,  but  we  have  individual  initiative. 
[9] 


The  Unpopitlar  History  of  the  United  States 

Our  lads  know  how  to  ride  and  shoot.  That's 
the  thing  that  counts. ' ' 

You  hear  that  kind  of  talk  all  over  the  coun- 
try— especially  about  individual  initiative. 

Your  Uncle  Samuel  used  to  think  that  same 
way,  until  developments  in  modern  warfare 
knocked  it  out  of  his  head.  Modern  warfare 
is  a  question  of  team  work.  You  can 't  accom- 
plish anything  nowadays  by  every  fellow 
pulling  his  own  way.  Where  would  the 
Giants,  or  the  Phillies,  or  the  Bed  Sox  be 
without  organization?  You  could  put  a  thou- 
sand fine  individuals  into  the  diamond,  and 
nine  trained  players  plus  team-work,  would 
play  rings  around  them.  Soldiers,  like  base- 
ball teams,  can't  get  anywhere  on  an  individ- 
ual basis.  That 's  another  kink  that  we  Amer- 
icans must  get  out  of  our  heads — individual- 
ism. We  are  habitually  intolerant  of  re- 
straint. We  resent  the  slightest  encroach- 
ment upon  our  personal  privilege  to  do  as  we 
please.  If  the  notion  strikes  us  to  play  at 
soldiering,  very  well,  soldiers  we  will  play — 
whenever  we  get  ready  and  for  just  as  long 
[10] 


Uncle  Sam  Keeps  Going 


as  it  suits  us.  The  average  American  having 
volunteered  for  a  few  months,  frequently  car- 
ries this  idea  with  him  and  stops  to  ask  ques- 
tions, before  he  obeys  an  order.  Individual- 
ism is  his  most  petted  possession.  He  argues 
that  we  have  been  victorious  in  five  foreign 
wars  on  this  basis  of  individual  initiative, 
and  sees  no  sense  in  quitting  a  good  thing. 
Lots  of  people  talk  that  way.  It's  one  of  the 
biggest  troubles  in  this  country. 


[11] 


in 

THE  FICTION  OF  INVINCIBLE 
MILITIA 

I  AM  going  to  tell  you  some  facts  that  will 
make  you  think.  I  don't  care  a  hang  what  you 
think — to  begin  with.  I  don't  care  what  any 
American  thinks,  if  he  will  only  think  at  all. 
I've  got  a  pig-headed  faith  that  Americans 
are  going  to  think  right  before  they  get  done 
thinking. 

Our  tradition  of  the  invincible  militia  and 
the  victorious  Minutemen  had  its  birth  at 
[12] 


The  Fiction  of  Invincible  Militia 

Bunker  Hill.  Frenzied  orators,  fiery  poets 
and  solemn  school  books  have  repeatedly  as- 
sured us  that  a  few  dozen  stalwart  plowboys 
routed  the  redcoat  army  with  a  loss  of  about 
1,054  men.  This  temporary  success  led  to  a 
practically  unbroken  series  of  disasters.  The 
enthusiasm  of  Bunker  Hill  crystallized  into  a 
complacent  state  of  public  mind,  and  one  and 
forty  years  of  equally  complacent  military 
laws.  From  that  day  forward  our  national 
existence  has  depended  upon  a  handful  of 
regulars  and  a  hope — a  hope  that,  at  the 
sound  of  Freedom's  bugle  trump,  vast  num- 
bers of  conquering  citizens  would  rush  to 
arms. 

Eevolutionary  leaders  framed  their  plans 
upon  this  rush,  and,  my  son,  the  recruits 
didn't  rush.  That's  the  truth  about  it.  If 
you  don't  believe  me,  just  ask  George  Wash- 
ington, who  made  quite  a  considerable  repu- 
tation in  his  neighborhood  for  telling  the 
truth.  At  the  opening  of  the  Revolution 
Washington  thought  just  like  the  balance  of 
us,  that  patriots  would  flock  to  the  banners 
[13] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

of  freedom  and  hurl  the  tyrant's  minions 
from  our  shores.  But  the  flocking  and  the 
hurling  went  on  mighty  slow. 

Some  way  or  other  the  New  England  Min- 
utemen  contrived  to  get  in  the  first  lick,  strik- 
ing the  British  at  Lexington  and  Concord 
Bridge.  Those  wrathy  farmers  chased  the 
redcoats  for  more  than  twenty  miles.  Pick- 
ing them  off  like  robins  from  behind  trees 
and  stone  walls,  they  killed  and  wounded  223 
soldiers,  with  a  loss  to  themselves  of  88  men. 
That 's  what  started  us  down  the  wrong  road ; 
it  looked  too  easy. 

Three  days  later,  April  22,  1775,  the  Con- 
gress of  Massachusetts  resolved  that  an  army 
of  30,000  men  was  necessary  for  defense  of 
the  Colony,  and  attempted  to  raise  at  once 
thirteen  thousand  six  hundred  by  voluntary 
enlistments  of  men  who  had  got  a  taste  of 
victory  and  ached  to  finish  the  job. 

Eight  here  and  now  I  want  to  call  your  at- 
tention to  the  vicious  practice  which  Massa- 
chusetts then  adopted  of  giving  a  Captain's 
commission  to  any  one  who  could  enroll  a 
[14] 


The  Fiction  of  Invincible  Militia 

company  of  59  men,  and  making  a  Colonel  of 
the  first  politician  who  could  get  together  ten 
such  companies.  This  system  has  been  em- 
ployed, without  exception,  at  the  beginning  of 
all  our  wars.  You  can  easily  see  how  that 
works;  a  hail-fellow-well-met  is  put  in  com- 
mand. The  hustling  life  insurance  agent 
probably  becomes  Captain.  The  shrewd  po- 
litical boss  gets  a  Colonel's  commission,  while 
the  educated  officer,  who  is  not  a  good  mixer, 
is  elected  to  stay  at  home.  And  do  you  know, 
my  son,  that  we  have  never  got  away  from 
that  system? 

The  victors  of  Concord  and  Lexington  as- 
sembled near  Boston  without  organization, 
and  only  by  courtesy  recognizing  a  common 
commander.  Old  Israel  Putnam  had  gump- 
tion enough  to  protect  his  men  behind  rail 
breastworks,  saying:  "These  Americans  are 
never  afraid  for  their  heads :  they  only  think 
of  their  legs.  Shelter  their  legs  and  they  will 
fight  forever." 

And  they  did  fight ;  they  put  up  a  powerful 
hot  scrap  on  a  powerful  hot  day,  June  17, 
[15] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

beating  off  three  assaults  by  British  regu- 
lars, who  lost  more  than  a  thousand  men. 

Congress  immediately  authorized  the  en- 
listment of  20,370  men  for  service  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Boston.  They  apprehended 
great  trouble  in  keeping  the  patriot  ranks 
thinned  down  to  that  meager  stand.  The  first 
shot  at  Concord  Bridge  had  rung  around  the 
world,  according  to  an  optimistic  poet.  Co- 
lonial martyrs  lay  dead.  Redcoats  went 
tramping  across  the  land,  and  the  colonists 
were  supposed  to  be  ablaze  with  indignation. 
Yet,  at  the  end  of  a  month,  only  966  volun- 
teers had  presented  themselves.  That  was 
not  much  of  a  rush.  My  son,  you  ought  to 
have  seen  how  beautifully  they  restrained 
their  enthusiasm.  Their  rush  was  most  de- 
liberate and  decorous. 

Now  don't  get  cranky,  and  suppose  that  I 
am  throwing  rocks  at  anybody's  venerable 
New  England  ancestors.  Your  own  venerable 
ancestors  in  Virginia  and  Georgia  did  pre- 
cisely the  same  thing.  What  I'm  talking 
about  is  the  bad  system. 
[16] 


IV 
THE  BUSH  THAT  NEVER  RUSHED 

BY  December  15,  1775,  only  5,917  men  had 
enlisted,  not  quite  a  third.  George  Washing- 
ton didn't  like  this  and  spoke  his  mind:  "I 
am  sorry  to  mention  the  egregious  want  of 
public  spirit.  Instead  of  pressing  to  be  en- 
gaged in  the  cause  of  their  country,  which  I 
vainly  flattered  myself  would  be  the  case,  I 
find  we  are  likely  to  be  deserted  at  the  most 
critical  time." 

[17] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

There  were  splendid  examples  of  patriotic 
unselfishness.  Twelve  companies  of  riflemen 
reported  near  Boston,  some  of  them  having 
marched  a  distance  of  800  miles.  These  were 
the  first  troops  raised  upon  authority  of  the 
Continental  Congress,  and  were  soon  recog- 
nized as  the  six  best  corps  in  the  army.  In 
spite  of  cold  and  starvation  and  suffering 
they  fought  throughout  the  war,  and  formed 
the  backbone  of  those  gallant  troops  which 
finally  achieved  our  independence.  But  they 
had  eight  years'  service,  my  son,  and  became 
veterans. 

The  Continental  Congress,  bear  in  mind, 
had  no  authority  whatever  to  raise  or  pay  or 
equip  a  single  soldier.  Congress  could  mere- 
ly pass  resolutions  and  appeal  to  the  sover- 
eign states. 

Minutemen  volunteered,  quite  a  bunch  of 
them.  They  came  in  a  minute  and  stayed 
about  a  minute.  Each  day  Washington  had 
a  different  army  from  the  one  of  yesterday, 
and  generally  smaller.  Which  explains  his 
letter  of  November  28,  1775: 
[18] 


The  Rush  that  Never  Rushed 

"After  the  last  of  this  month  our  lines  will 
be  so  weakened  that  the  Minntemen  and  mili- 
tia must  be  called  in  for  their  defense.  And 
these,  being  under  no  kind  of  government 
themselves,  will  destroy  what  little  subordi- 
nation I  have  been  laboring  to  establish.*' 

Recruiting  went  slower  than  cold  molasses, 
and  Washington  himself  is  authority  for  the 
statement  that  men  were  "holding  back  to 
see  what  advantages  could  be  gained,  and 
whether  or  not  they  could  extort  a  bounty. " 
Every  school  boy  will  naturally  spurn  the 
suggestion  that  patriots  of  the  Eevolution 
would  put  up  their  services  at  public  auction. 
But  nobody  has  ever  written  for  the  school 
boy  a  popular  history  of  the  bounty  system. 

That  was  not  the  worst  of  it.  Most  of  those 
volunteers  engaged  for  short  terms  only,  and 
were  so  fidgety  to  return  home,  that  some  of 
them  left  camp  ahead  of  time  ' '  getting  away 
with  their  arms  and  ammunition. ' ' 

The  Governor  to  whom  Washington  wrote 
these  facts  expressed  his  great  indignation, 
adding  this  illuminating  phrase :  ' '  The  pulse 
[19] 


The  Unpopidar  History  of  the  United  States 

of  the  New  England  man  beats  high  for  liber- 
ty. His  engagement  in  the  service  he  thinks 
purely  voluntary,  therefore,  when  the  time 
for  enlistment  is  out,  he  thinks  himself  not 
holden  without  further  engagement." 

Of  course,  that  is  the  law,  a  perfectly  legal 
construction  to  put  upon  their  contract  of 
employment.  Nearly  one  hundred  years  later 
we  find  a  similar  instance  at  the  first  battle 
of  Bull  Kun. 

School  boys  do  not  regard  George  Wash- 
ington as  a  chronic  complainer.  Yet  his  let- 
ters are  full  of  paragraphs  like  this :  '  *  Noth- 
ing can  surpass  the  impatience  of  the  troops 
to  get  to  their  firesides.  Nearly  three  hun- 
dred of  them  arrived  a  few  days  ago  unable 
to  do  any  duty.  But  as  soon  as  I  administered 
that  grand  specific,  a  discharge,  they  instant- 
ly acquired  health,  and  rather  than  be  de- 
tained a  few  days  to  cross  Lake  George,  un- 
dertook a  march  of  200  miles  with  the  great- 
est alacrity." 

Doesn't  this  jar  upon  your  reverential 
ideals,  to  picture  300  heroes  of  the  Revolu- 
[20] 


The  Rush  that  Never  Rushed 

tion  limping  around  camp  until  Washington 
told  them  to  go  home,  when  they  suddenly 
became  able  to  march  the  distance  from  New 
York  to  Washington? 

In  consequence  of  slow  voluntary  enlist- 
ments, and  the  promptitude  with  which  the 
short  time  recruit  hiked  himself  homeward, 
it  was  considered  expedient  to  try  the  worst 
possible  makeshift — a  bounty.  The  unpalata- 
ble truth  is  that  by  the  middle  of  1775,  before 
the  glorious  Declaration  of  Independence,  it 
had  become  necessary  to  pay  men  so  much 
money  for  volunteering,  making  mercenaries 
of  the  first  soldiers  of  this  republic.  On  the 
6th  day  of  December,  1775,  the  Continental 
Congress  passed  this  resolution: 

' '  That  the  charge  of  bounty  in  the  accounts 
exhibited  by  the  Colony  of  Ehode  Island 
against  the  United  Colonies  be  not  allowed." 

Something  had  to  be  done.  Washington 
recognized  the  failure  of  the  volunteer  system 
and  suggested  "coercive  measures"  to  fill  his 
regiments.  But  feeble  Congress  was  afraid 
to  take  such  a  radical  step ;  instead  of  devis- 
[21] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

ing  a  plan  of  universal  service  it  tried  the 
more  popular  scheme  of  spurring  patriotism 
with  cash,  and  began  bidding  for  men  under 
the  bounty  system.  Up,  and  up  and  up  the 
climbing  prices  went.  Four  dollars  bid !  Six 
dollars  and  sixty-six  cents !  Ten  dollars  bid ! 
By  1778  ruling  quotations  had  reached  $20 
and  100  acres  of  land.  But  the  rush  did  not 
occur.  Something  else  did  occur.  Bounties 
made  it  impossible  to  get  voluntary  recruits, 
and  before  the  end  of  1777  Virginia  and  Mas- 
sachusetts both  had  recourse  to  the  draft — 
conscription,  compulsion,  universal  service, 
or  whatever  you  are  pleased  to  call  it.  The 
states  bidding  for  men  against  the  Congress 
caused  large  numbers  to  desert  and  go  home 
to  grab  the  greater  bounty.  By  1779  the 
bounty  had  increased  to  $200  to  any  able  bod- 
ied recruit  who  would  enlist  for  the  war. 
Then  New  Jersey  offered  $250,  in  addition  to 
the  $200,  the  clothing  and  land  allowed  by 
Congress.  The  Virginia  Council  raised  the 
limit  to  $750,  in  lieu  of  all  other  bounties. 
This  created  great  dissatisfaction  among 
[22] 


The  Rush  that  Never  Rushed 

the  men  who  had  previously  enlisted  at  the 
cut  rate  of  $4,  $6.66  and  $10.  To  keep  them 
in  good  humor,  and  in  service,  Congress 
granted  a  back  bounty  of  $100  each. 

Under  these  increasing  bounties  our  arm- 
ies in  the  field  steadily  decreased  from  89,661 
in  1776  to  29,340  in  1781.  During  that  period 
we  had  employed  nearly  four  hundred  thou- 
sand men.  Fewer  than  30,000  now  remained 
in  the  ranks.  Desertions  became  so  numer- 
ous that  early  in  1779  it  was  necessary  for 
Congress  to  recommend  a  punishment  of  fine 
and  whipping,  think  of  it — whipping — for 
all  who  should  knowingly  harbor  a  deserter. 

So  much  for  this  Revolutionary  rush  to 
arms  which  didn't  rush.  The  scramble  for 
men  was  like  the  Irishman's  idea  of  a  fox 
hunt.  Seeing  the  scarlet  hunters  racing  and 
chasing,  and  trying  to  catch  the  fox,  he  re- 
marked, "Begod,  the  dom  baste  is  hell  to 
catch,  and  ain't  worth  a  dom  after  you  catch 
him." 


[23] 


WHAT  THE  SHOET-TEEM  MILITIA  DID 

IT  was  like  pulling  hen's  teeth  to  secure 
the  short-term  militiamen.  Now  we  shall 
see  what  they  accomplished  while  actually 
in  service.  And  let  me  say  again,  over  and 
over,  that  I  mean  to  cast  no  slur  upon  those 
individual  men;  what  they  did  was  common 
to  short-term  untrained  recruits  in  all  coun- 
tries, at  all  times,  among  all  peoples. 

In  1775  "Washington  had  17,000  men  under 
[24] 


What  the  Short  Term  Militia  Did 

his  command,  14,500  of  whom  were  fit  for 
duty.  The  effective  redcoats  did  not  exceed 
6,500,  yet  the  Father  of  His  Country,  with 
twice  their  force,  dared  not  hazard  an  at- 
tack. Why?  Because  Washington  was  him- 
self a  soldier,  and  knew  better.  Although 
having  great  advantage  in  quantity  he  was 
over-matched  in  quality.  The  British  were 
trained  and  disciplined  and  organized — a 
compact  force ;  the  Americans  scarcely  hung 
together  as  a  mob.  Bear  in  mind,  that  one 
group  of  men  may  be  the  lowest  of  cutthroats 
and  plunderers — yet  be  soldiers.  Another 
group,  inspired  by  lofty  purposes  and  highest 
ideals,  may  be  no  more  than  a  mob.  It  is  not 
patriotism — nor  courage,  but  discipline  and 
training,  that  marks  the  distinction  which 
Washington  so  wisely  recognized. 

On  account  of  short  enlistments  and  the  ir- 
resistible homeward  tendency  of  recruits,  Rev- 
olutionary leaders  were  repeatedly  forced  to 
give  battle  under  adverse  circumstances — be- 
fore the  terms  of  their  men  expired  and  left 
them  minus  an  army.  This  caused  the  disas- 
[25] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

ter  at  Quebec.  Impatient  militiamen  refused 
to  remain  and  take  the  fortress  by  siege,  so 
the  gallant  General  Montgomery  risked  a 
premature  assault,  lost  his  own  life,  had 
sixty  Americans  killed,  and  three  or  four 
hundred  captured. 

During  1775  the  Colonies  maintained  at 
public  expense  37,623  men,  a  force  which 
from  want  of  supplies  and  organization  spent 
the  year  in  a  state  of  demoralizing  inactivity. 

The  campaign  of  1776  opened  under  heart- 
breaking conditions.  General  Washington 
had  entered  the  conflict  with  the  buoyant  hope 
that  his  patriotic  countrymen  would  swell 
the  armies  of  freedom.  On  January  14th,  he 
wrote : 

"  Search  the  volumes  of  history  and  I  much 
question  whether  a  case  similar  to  ours  is  to 
be  found,  namely,  to  maintain  a  post  against 
the  flower  of  the  British  troops  for  six  months 
together,  without  powder,  and  then  to  have 
one  army  disbanded  and  another  to  be  raised 
within  the  same  distance  of  a  reenf  orced  en- 
emy. The  same  desire  to  retire  into  the  chim- 
[26] 


What  the  Short  Term  Militia  Did 

ney  corner  seized  the  troops  from  New 
Hampshire,  Ehode  Island  and  Massachu- 
setts so  soon  as  their  time  expired,  as  had 
wrought  upon  those  of  Connecticut,  notwith- 
standing many  of  them  made  a  tender  of  their 
services  to  continue  until  the  line  could  be 
sufficiently  strengthened.  We  are  now  left 
with  a  good  deal  less  than  half-raised  regi- 
ments, and  about  5,000  militia,  who  only 
stand  engaged  to  the  middle  of  this  month, 
when  according  to  custom  they  will  retire, 
whether  the  necessity  for  their  staying  be 
ever  so  urgent." 

What  a  sickening  picture  of  the  steadfast 
Washington  watching  Freedom's  army 
dwindle  away  before  his  very  eyes,  shifting 
and  changing  like  the  sands  of  the  desert. 
Believe  me,  my  son,  Father  was  having  a 
batch  of  trouble  with  the  children. 

Cordially  as  Washington  detested  the 
bounty,  which  he  regarded  as  the  twin  broth- 
er of  desertion,  he  was  now  forced  to  waive 
all  objections,  nay,  even  to  urge  that  $20  or 
[27] 


Tlie  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

$30  be  paid  to  "engage  men  to  enlist  until 
January  next. " 

Hold  still,  my  son,  drive  a  peg  down,  right 
here,  and  hitch  to  this  idea :  I  am  speaking 
of  raw  militia  and  not  of  trained  men.  Plen- 
ty of  these  recruits — raw  as  green  persim- 
mons to  begin  with — joined  the  standard  of 
liberty  from  the  noblest  motives.  They  were 
brave  fellows,  with  good  sand  in  their  craw 
and  could  stand  punishment — individually. 
Yet  the  individual  must  be  trained  to  make  a 
soldier — or  a  hoss  doctor  or  anything  else — 
I  don't  care  a  thrip  how  smart  he  is.  Under- 
stand me,  I  'm  not  posted  on  military  matters 
myself.  When  somebody  chases  me  up  a  tree 
I  call  on  George  Washington.  George  says : 

'  *  To  bring  men  to  be  well  acquainted  with 
the  duties  of  a  soldier  requires  time.  To 
bring  them  under  proper  discipline  and  sub- 
ordination, not  only  requires  time,  but  is  a 
work  of  great  difficulty;  and  in  this  army, 
where  there  is  so  little  distinction  between 
officers  and  soldiers,  it  requires  an  uncommon 
[28] 


What  the  Short  Term  Militia  Did 

degree  of  attention.  Men  who  are  familiar- 
ized with  danger  meet  it  without  shrinking; 
whereas  troops  unused  to  service,  often  ap- 
prehend danger  where  no  danger  is." 


[29] 


VI 

PESTERING  FATHER  WITH  POP- 
CALLS 

THE  great  human  heart  of  Washington 
beat  sympathetically;  with  his  people.  He  un- 
derstood that  men  of  kindly  feelings,  fresh 
from  all  the  tender  associations  of  domestic 
life,  "are  not  sufficiently  fortified  to  stand 
the  shocking  scenes  of  war.  To  march  over 
dead  men,  to  hear  without  concern  the  groans 
of  the  wounded,  few  men  can  endure  such 
scenes  unless  steeled  by  habit  or  fortified  by 
military  pride." 

[30] 


Pestering  Father  with  Pop-Calls 

It  pestered  Father  mightily  to  have  these 
pop-call  volunteers  blowing  in  on  him  and 
blowing  out  again.  Some  of  them  never  tar- 
ried long  enough  to  hang  up  their  hats.  They 
had  implicit  confidence  in  George,  and  were 
willing  to  leave  it  to  George.  But  if  George 
ever  got  them  haltered  and  tied,  he  made  sol- 
diers to  brag  of :  "  Our  soldiers  are  as  good 
as  ever  were,  and  were  the  officers  half  as 
good  as  the  men  they  would  beat  any  army 
on  the  globe  of  equal  number.  But  neither 
officers  nor  men  have  the  requisite  subordi- 
nation and  discipline."  His  come-and-go 
militia  did  not  consider  themselves  bound  by 
the  same  restrictions  as  governed  the  Conti- 
nental regulars,  and  destroyed  what  little 
discipline  Washington  succeeded  in  hammer- 
ing into  his  men. 

Looking  only  at  the  cost,  throughout  the 
Eevolution  it  would  have  been  far  cheaper  to 
maintain  fifty  or  a  hundred  thousand  Conti- 
nentals, rather  than  half  as  many,  and  depend 
for  the  balance  upon  hastily  gathered  militia. 
Huge  levies  were  employed,  which  accom- 
[31] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

plished  nothing,  and  cost  more  money  than  a 
permanent  establishment. 

In  those  days  folks  held  a  powerful  strong 
prejudice  against  a  standing  army,  as  being 
dangerous  to  liberty.  A  standing  army  may 
be  dangerous,  but  believe  me,  son,  a  running 
militia  is  worse. 

Now  get  this  notion  straight  in  your  head : 
As  I  have  said  and  will  say  again,  it  is  not 
a  question  of  the  courage  and  patriotism  of 
the  individual  volunteer.  Men  who  were  not 
hardened  to  seeing  their  friends  shot  down 
beside  them,  not  accustomed  to  hearing  the 
moans  of  wounded  comrades,  simply  couldn't 
stand  it,  no  matter  how  great  their  individual 
courage.  Revolutionary  volunteers  were 
brothers,  sons,  and  fathers  of  the  Continental 
regulars,  those  sturdy  and  steadfast  troops 
who  stuck  through  it  all,  from  first  to  last; 
they  became  veterans,  as  good  as  ever  trod 
shoe  leather.  Between  eight  and  ten  thou- 
sand Continentals,  starving,  freezing,  and 
naked,  never  thought  of  giving  up  throughout 
that  terrible  winter  at  Valley  Forge.  And 
[32] 


Pestering  Father  with  Pop-Calls 

had  it  not  been  for  this  resolute  group  the 
cause  of  libery  was  lost. 

On  the  other  hand,  their  inefficient  brothers 
of  the  militia  generally  spread  disorder,  mu- 
tiny and  panic  until  Washington  said  that 
' '  the  militia  was  more  hurtful  than  helpful  to 
the  cause  of  independence." 

Washington  had  about  8,000  militia  of  this 
kind  to  oppose  Lord  Howe  on  Long  Island. 
The  British  outnumbered  him  two  to  one. 
Washington  was  beaten.  A  repulse  does  not 
necessarily  destroy  an  army  of  trained  sol- 
diers. A  good  drubbing  may  only  make  a 
bunch  of  veterans  grit  their  teeth  and  stand 
firmer.  It  riles  'em.  But  if  you  defeat  the 
militia  and  start  'em  to  turning  tail,  they  take 
the  route  to  scatteration.  It  is  mighty  pitiful 
to  hear  the  old  General  telling  about  how 
his  troops  behaved  on  this  humiliating  day. 
Washington  heard  the  first  shots  of  the  bat- 
tle and  galloped  to  the  front.  Instead  of  find- 
ing his  men  fighting  valiantly  on  the  battle 
line,  they  were  flying  in  every  direction,  with 
their  officers  striving  in  vain  to  rally  them. 
[331 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

Washington  succeeded  in  stopping  the  rout 
for  a  minute,  until  a  squad  of  60  or  70  red- 
coats appeared  in  the  distance.  Then  the 
panic-stricken  militia  bolted  away  from  their 
Commander-in-Chief  and  hustled  hot-foot 
through  the  woods  without  even  remembering 
that  they  carried  guns. 

A  standing  army  might  have  stood,  but  the 
running  militia  didn't.  They  got  started,  and 
kept  going,  going,  gone — never  halting  this 
side  of  home.  They  deserted  Washington  by 
companies,  by  half  regiments,  almost  by 
whole  regiments.  On  account  of  their  lack  of 
discipline  and  refusal  to  submit  to  any  kind  of 
restraint,  Father  at  this  time  admitted  that  he 
had  lost  confidence  in  the  generality  of  his 
troops.  As  a  result  of  which  the  British  oc- 
cupied the  City  of  New  York. 

Washington  immediately  wrote  to  Con- 
gress that  "our  liberties  must  be  greatly 
handicapped,  if  not  entirely  lost,  if  their  de- 
fense is  left  to  anything  but  a  permanent 
standing  army.  I  mean,  one  to  exist  during 
the  war. " 

[34] 


Pestering  Father  with  Pop-Calls 

The  Commander-in-Chief  now  faced  an  en- 
tire dissolution  of  his  army,  which  congre- 
gated and  separated  like  the  crowds  in  a  mov- 
ing picture  show. 


[35] 


vn 

THE  EUNNING  MILITIA 

LISTEN  to  your  Uncle  Samuel !  Human  na- 
ture does  not  change.  We  are  mighty  near 
the  same  kind  of  white  folks  to-day.  When 
men  get  hot  in  the  collar  they'll  reach  around 
and  grab  the  first  weapon  they  can  lay  hands 
on  to  fight  with.  After  scrapping  awhile  they 
get  tired  and  want  to  quit.  That's  where  dis- 
cipline comes  in.  Father  used  to  talk  like  a 
Dutch  uncle  to  his  children,  arguing  about 
[36] 


The  Running  Militia 


the  "nobility  of  the  cause  of  freedom," 
"come  on  boys,"  all  that  sort  of  thing.  No- 
body disputed  a  word  he  said.  "Yep,  it's  a 
bully  good  cause ;  everybody  ought  to  be  free. 
But  'tain't  my  business  to  fight  no  more  than 
that  other  fellow's."  They  left  it  pretty 
much  to  George. 

Now  if  you've  got  it  well  planted  in  your 
head,  the  kind  of  militia  we  used  during  the 
Eevolution,  I'll  tell  you  what  they  did — just 
a  few  things. 

At  Lexington,  Concord  and  Bunker  Hill 
they  fought  like  thunderation,  on  the  inde- 
pendent plan.  But  volunteers  and  militia  are 
always  shortwinded.  After  that  most  of  'em 
sat  down  for  a  spell  to  stretch  out  and  talk 
it  over. 

At  Quebec,  when  their  terms  were  expiring, 
they  got  so  fidgety  to  go  home  and  look  after 
the  crops  that  they  caused  the  loss  of  the  ex- 
pedition and  the  death  of  General  Montgom- 
ery. 

They  scattered  on  Long  Island  before  Lord 
Howe  like  leaves  before  the  wind. 
[37] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  tJie  United  States 

Washington  retired  from  White  Plains  be- 
cause he  had  no  dependable  troops.  The  Brit- 
ish on  their  return  to  New  York  incidentally 
captured  Fort  Washington  with  2,000  Ameri- 
can prisoners.  General  Washington  was  com- 
pelled to  cross  the  Delaware  with  5,000  troops 
because  his  militiamen  were  disbanding,  and 
he  was  powerless  to  make  even  a  show  of  re- 
sistance. 

Yet  on  the  26th  of  December,  by  a  brilliant 
surprise  of  the  Hessians  at  Trenton,  Wash- 
ington with  a  force  of  2,400,  captured  900 
prisoners  without  losing  a  man. 

His  victory  at  Princeton  ended  the  cam- 
paign with  a  loss  to  the  British  of  400  killed, 
wounded  and  prisoners. 

My  son,  folks  brag  mightily  on  their  Uncle 
Samuel  for  a  sharp  horse  trader  and  tight- 
fisted  Yankee.  Maybe  so,  maybe  so,  but  it 
appears  to  me  that  in  managing  my  army  I 
have  been  saving  at  the  spigot  and  losing  at 
the  bung.  In  1776  I  was  paying  a  force  of 
Continentals  and  militia  numbering  89,661 
[38] 


The  Running  Militia 


men.  My  biggest  guess  at  the  redcoats  is 
34,000  men. 

With  all  that  force  I  should  have  been  able 
to  do  something.  But  my  fellows  were  picked 
up  here  and  there  and  yonder;  and  I  never 
kept  them  hired  long  enough  to  get  them  field 
broke.  There  was  no  way  to  swarm  a  big 
enough  bunch  in  one  place  at  one  time  to  hit 
the  British.  The  only  offensive  operations 
that  we  felt  sufficiently  strong  to  undertake 
were  in  the  vicinity  of  Boston,  at  Trenton  and 
at  Princeton.  I  squandered  millions  upon 
millions  on  short-term  recruits  who  never 
stayed  in  ranks  long  enough  to  learn  which 
was  hay-foot  and  which  was  straw-foot,  and 
were  not  worth  their  board  and  keep. 

Throughout  the  Revolution  these  raw  re- 
cruits generally  had  their  running  gear  set 
on  the  hair  trigger.  Our  mistakes  in  the  be- 
ginning of  the  war  were  repeated  over  and 
over  again,  always  the  same  sad  story:  at 
Camden  the  hasty  levies  stampeded  and  ran 
from  the  first  shot,  leaving  their  steadfast 
Continental  comrades  to  be  slaughtered,  the 
[39] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

latter  losing  seventy  officers  and  2,000  men. 
This  crushing  defeat,  and  the  surrender  of 
5,000  Americans  at  Charleston — which  cost 
us  nearly  the  whole  of  North  Carolina,  South 
Carolina  and  Georgia — were  not  compensated 
for  by  the  minor  exploits  of  Marion  and  Sum- 
ter. 

Eeferring  to  Camden,  General  Washington 
wrote:  "This  event  shows  the  fatal  conse- 
quences of  depending  on  militia.  Eegular 
troops  alone  are  equal  to  the  exigencies  of 
modern  war.  No  militia  will  ever  acquire  the 
habits  necessary  to  resist  a  regular  force.  The 
firmness  requisite  for  the  real  business  of 
fighting  is  only  to  be  attained  by  a  constant 
course  of  discipline  and  training." 

Excuse  me,  son,  if  I  cuss  once  in  a  while ; 
don't  put  that  down.  But  I  get  mad  every 
time  I  think  of  General  Stevens,  at  the  battle 
of  Cowpens,  being  forced  to  place  a  guard 
behind  his  militiamen  with  orders  to  shoot 
the  first  recruit  who  left  his  post.  Isn't  that 
a  disgraceful  proposition  for  patriots  fighting 
in  the  cause  of  freedom? 
[401 


The  Running  Militia 


My  boy,  I  Ve  made  a  lot  of  mistakes  that  I 
had  rather  forget.  But  we  are  now  engaged 
in  a  war  of  such  magnitude,  such  devilish  in- 
genuity, that  we  must  look  facts  squarely  in 
the  face.  They  are  ugly  facts,  yet  you  can't 
blink  at  'em,  or  hide  your  head  in  the  sand 
like  an  ostrich.  The  ostrich  lays  himself 
mighty  liable  to  a  rear-end  collision.  I  wish 
you  would  tell  these  facts  to  every  young 
militiaman  in  the  United  States.  It  won't 
hurt  their  feelings.  They  are  beginning  to 
understand.  Every  youngster  who  has  spent 
a  few  weeks  in  training  camp  comes  to  realize 
that  courage,  willingness,  and  the  basic  qual- 
ities of  manhood  are  insufficient — he  must 
learn  how  to  handle  himself. 

The  famous  Light  Horse  Harry  Lee  was  a 
great  soldier,  and  he  manfully  insisted  that 
"that  Government  is  the  murderer  of  its  citi- 
zens who  sends  them  into  the  field  uninformed 
and  untaught." 


[41] 


vm 

A  STBANGEE  COMES 

DURING  the  entire  Kevolutionary  War  of 
eight  long  years,  we  never  whipped  the  Brit- 
ish in  bnt  two  fights  which  had  the  slightest 
effect  in  driving  them  from  this  continent. 
Only  one  of  these  battles  did  we  gain  unaided. 
At  Stillwater  we  captured  General  Burgoyne 
with  5,791  men,  the  Continentals  and  militia 
numbering  about  17,000,  with  a  total  force 
present  and  fit  for  duty  of  13,020.  Of  these 
[42] 


A  Stranger  Comes 


?,090  were  regular  Continental  soldiers.  So 
that  we  outnumbered  the  British  at  Stillwater 
about  two  and  a  half  or  three  to  one.  Our 
only  other  decisive  victory  was  the  surrender 
of  Cornwallis  at  Yorktown,  which  we  shall 
discuss  presently. 

In  spite  of  increasing  bounties,  and  Wash- 
ington's constant  pleading  for  a  good  army, 
his  force  in  New  Jersey  when  the  campaign 
opened  in  March,  1777,  was  reduced  to  3,000 
men  of  whom  2,000  were  militia  engaged  for 
no  longer  than  the  last  of  March.  And  yet 
the  total  forces  of  men  employed  by  us  dur- 
ing that  year  was  68,720  men. 

Our  wrangling,  disjointed  Government  was 
just  about  as  futile  and  disorganized  as  were 
our  forces  in  the  field.  The  Articles  of  Con- 
federation, which  created  a  loosely  hung  part- 
nership of  Colonies,  went  into  effect  in  July, 
1778.  This  formed  a  League  of  Friendship 
for  common  defense,  the  jealous  purpose  of 
which  was  evidently  to  safeguard  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  States,  and  not  to  provide  a 
strong  Federal  government.  Individualism 
[43] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

again,  and  not  team  work.  The  Continental 
Congress  had  no  power  to  carry  on  war,  to  en- 
list a  soldier,  to  levy  taxes,  nor  to  enforce 
a  requisition  for  money  or  for  men.  Instead 
of  vesting  the  war  power  in  a  central  govern- 
ment, which  alone  could  insure  its  vigorous 
exercise,  Congress  was  nothing  more  than  a 
consulting  body  of  diplomats  with  authority 
to  entreat  but  not  to  compel.  No  measures 
could  be  taken  for  common  defense  except 
such  as  were  separately  sanctioned  by  nine  of 
the  allied  sovereignties.  My  son,  I  have  al- 
ways heard  that  a  kind-hearted  Providence 
watched  over  children  and  fools  and  the 
United  States.  We  needed  it.  But,  listen  to 
your  Uncle  Samuel.  Providence  has  a  mighty 
big  job  on  its  hands  right  now,  and  we  had 
better  learn  to  crawl  and  stand  ourselves. 

Just  imagine  what  a  gabfest  the  Congress 
and  state  legislatures  must  have  had  when  to 
the  vacillations  and  delays  of  Congress  itself 
were  added  the  interminable  debates  of  nine 
State  legislatures.  It  makes  me  cuss  to  think 
about  it.  That's  why  our  impotent  Congress 
[44] 


A  Stranger  Comes 


passed  the  buck  to  George,  appointing  George 
Military  Dictator.  It  is  not  strength,  but 
weakness,  which  creates  dictators  over  a 
republic.  Here  was  Washington,  preaching 
the  equal  rights  of  all  men,  yet  by  his  soli- 
tary power  raising  armies  and  paying  them, 
ruling  millions  of  free  men  who  struggled  to 
attain  an  ideal  of  constitutional  liberty. 
Mighty  bad  precedent,  wasn't  it,  my  son? 
But  it  was  up  to  somebody  to  do  something, 
and  Congress  couldn't. 

They  got  their  business  in  such  a  jam,  be- 
fore making  Washington  dictator,  that  the 
Commander-in-Chief  could  not  even  secure 
the  promotion  of  an  officer  serving  under  him, 
an  officer  of  known  ability  and  skill.  It  was 
a  marvel  that  his  army  muddled  along  at  all. 
The  Washington  monument  ought  to  be  twice 
as  high. 

This  year  of  '78  brought  a  very  significant 
factor  to  our  shores,  far  more  significant  than 
anybody  dreamed  of  at  the  time.  A  stranger 
came,  the  Prussian  Baron  Steuben,  ex-officer 
of  Frederick  the  Great.  Steuben  brought  a 
[45] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

knowledge  of  organization  and  discipline 
gained  from  his  great  master.  He  was  ap- 
pointed Inspector-General  of  the  army,  and 
set  about  getting  things  into  shape.  A  fluent 
linguist,  Steuben  swore  in  fourteen  different 
languages,  which  was  none  too  many  for  those 
recruits.  He  straightened  out  even  the  three 
months'  men,  put  them  under  rules  and  kept 
them  under.  He  boiled  and  stewed  and  roast- 
ed those  raw  recruits  until  your  Uncle  Sam- 
uel began  to  get  action  for  the  money  he  was 
paying.  And,  my  son,  we  are  using  to-day 
much  of  what  we  learned  from  Baron  Steu- 
ben, using  it  to  fight  against  the  Prussian 
system  which  Frederick  the  Great  created. 


[46] 


IX 


THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  DISASTER 

THE  plan  of  voluntary  enlistments,  even 
when  puffed  up  by  outrageous  bounties,  hav- 
ing failed  to  raise  the  necessary  men,  Con- 
gress was  forced  to  recommend  the  draft — 
a  draft  for  the  armies  of  freedom.  Then  what 
happened?  To  escape  conscription  shifty 
patriots  began  hiring  substitutes,  hiding  be- 
hind any  old  scarecrow  that  they  could  shove 
into  the  ranks.  They  even  traded  for  a  job 
[47] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

lot  of  deserters  from  Burgoyne's  army. 
Think  of  it!  Bnying  and  paying  liberty's 
money  to  skulkers  who  had  sneaked  out  of 
British  regiments !  Thereupon  Father  wrote 
letters  and  told  these  proxy  patriots  exactly 
what  he  thought  about  them,  and  especially 
about  the  dangers  of  substituting  as  soldiers 
of  the  infant  republic  men  who  had  already 
given  proof  of  their  treacherous  dispositions. 
One  of  his  colonels  backed  up  Father  with 
the  proof  that  every  British  deserter,  except 
one,  had  in  turn  deserted  him,  stealing  prop- 
erties and  accouterments  as  they  left.  Any- 
way, they  were  impartial  deserters. 

My  son,  let  me  beat  into  your  head  some- 
thing else  about  this  whirligig  of  volunteer 
militia.  It  did  not  produce  an  army  of  sol- 
diers. But  as  a  mill  for  turning  out  pen- 
sioners it  went  on  grinding  day  and  night. 
The  greatest  force  of  soldiers  that  Washing- 
ton could  ever  get  together  in  one  command 
was  17,000.  But  after  the  smoke  blew  away 
I  had  on  my  hands,  in  one  bunch,  an  army  of 
95,753  pensioners. 

[48] 


The  Balance  Sheet  of  Disaster 

Let  us  pass  over,  charitably,  a  multitude  of 
such  errors,  insufficiencies  and  humiliations, 
coming  to  the  victory  which  decided  the  war. 
Lord  Cornwallis  surrendered  7,000  men  at 
Yorktown.  The  allied  French  and  Americans 
numbered  16,000  strong,  4,000  of  whom  were 
French  veterans.  Besides,  we  had  21  French 
ships  of  the  line.  So  that  in  this  affair  we 
outnumbered  the  enemy  by  nearly  two  and  a 
half  to  one,  without  counting  the  fleet. 

I  hate  to  harp  and  harp  on  such  discordant 
strings,  but  our  people  ought  to  know.  Plen- 
ty of  good  folks  in  the  towns  stick  to  it  that 
one  American  patriot  can  lick  ten  soldiers  of 
any  foreign  nation.  I  think  they  say  ten. 
We  can't  do  it,  and  the  sooner  we  learn  that, 
the  quicker  we'll  put  ourselves  in  shape  to 
make  the  Stars  and  Stripes  respected. 

The  record  of  short-term  volunteer  militia 
throughout  the  Revolution  was  an  almost 
continuous  performance  of  inefficiency,  de- 
sertions, mutinies,  and  that  particular  brand 
of  cowardice  which  comes  from  lack  of  disci- 
pline and  organization.  Not  that  the  recruits 
[49] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

were  personal  cowards.  They  had  merely 
failed  to  learn  the  lesson  of  cohesive  courage. 
During  those  eight  disastrous  years  we  em- 
ployed nearly  400,000  men — practically  ten 
times  the  redcoats — gaining  only  two  vic- 
tories of  consequence — Stillwater  and  York- 
town.  With  overwhelming  numbers  in  our 
favor,  fighting  on  our  own  soil,  we  failed  and 
continued  to  fail.  Why?  Because  the  indi- 
vidual American  is  inferior  to  the  individual 
Britisher?  Not  a  bit  of  it.  No  American  is 
willing  to  admit  that.  It  is  not  true.  But 
the  Briton  was  a  trained  soldier  who  knew  his 
trade.  Our  volunteers  and  militia  got  into 
each  other's  way.  They  had  no  conception 
of  team  work,  and  refused  to  learn.  They 
were  possessed  of  a  mob  spirit,  time  after 
time  breaking  into  defiant  insubordination 
and  mutiny,  even  killing  their  own  officers 
who  attempted  to  enforce  a  semblance  of  dis- 
cipline. For  example:  After  the  war  was 
over  some  eighty  recruits  mutinied  at  Lancas- 
ter, and  marched  to  Philadelphia.  Here  they 
were  joined  by  about  200  comrades  from  the 
[50] 


The  Balance  Sheet  of  Disaster 

barracks.  Proceeding  with  music  and  fixed 
bayonets  to  the  State  House,  where  Congress 
and  the  Council  of  Pennsylvania  were  in  ses- 
sion, they  stationed  sentinels  at  every  door 
to  prevent  egress,  and  then  served  upon  both 
bodies  a  written  demand  for  the  redress  of 
their  grievances,  threatening  military  vio- 
lence in  case  their  wrongs  were  not  righted 
within  the  brief  space  of  twenty  minutes.  For 
several  hours  Congress  and  the  Pennsylvania 
Council  found  themselves  at  the  mercy  of  an 
armed  and  undisciplined  soldiery.  In  this  ex- 
tremity, fearing  that  the  State  of  Pennsyl- 
vania could  not  furnish  adequate  protection, 
Congress  called  for  regular  troops,  aban- 
doned the  Capital  and  adjourned  to  meet  at 
Princeton.  Thus  a  few  rioting  recruits  forced 
the  flight  of  Congress.  These  were  mere  re- 
cruits, soldiers  of  a  day  who  had  not  borne  the 
heat  and  burden  of  the  war.  As  against  their 
behavior  contrast  the  veteran  Continentals. 
All  honor  to  them,  sturdy  and  steadfast,  who 
patiently  endured  hunger,  danger  and  cold; 
who  suffered  and  bled  without  a  murmur; 
[51] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

who  in  perfect  good  order  retired  to  their 
homes  without  a  settlement  of  their  accounts 
or  a  farthing  of  money  in  their  pockets. 
"What  an  absolutely  convincing  parallel !  On 
the  one  hand  the  turbulent  and  rebellious 
spirit  of  the  mob,  utterly  barren  of  results 
upon  the  battlefield,  but  ready  to  follow  the 
dictates  of  passion  and  the  mouthings  of  a 
demagogue.  On  the  other  hand,  the  self- 
restraint,  the  effective  and  competent  conduct 
of  the  Continental  regulars.  Bear  in  mind, 
my  son,  keep  bearing  it  in  mind,  never  forget, 
that  they  were  precisely  the  same  individual 
men  to  begin  with ;  they  came  from  the  same 
homes,  the  same  families  and  the  same  blood. 
The  only  difference  between  them  lay  in  their 
training.  Let  me  say  it  again,  we  Americans 
pride  ourselves  upon  our  individualism.  We 
love  to  do  just  as  we  darn  please,  and  hate 
anybody  to  give  us  orders.  This  brand  of  in- 
efficiency is  part  of  the  price  we  pay  for  de- 
mocracy. 

Someway  or  other,  by  the  help  of  Provi- 
dence and  the  French,  in  some  kind  of  fash- 
[521 


The  Balance  Sheet  of  Disaster 

ion,  by  main  strength  and  awkwardness,  we 
managed  to  stumble  through  the  Eevolution 
to  a  successful  if  not  a  triumphant  conclusion. 
It  was  the  French,  however,  who  finally 
achieved  our  independence,  and  we  can  never 
repay  them.' 

We  could  not  have  won  without  the  French. 
After  eight  years  of  fighting  for  freedom, 
eight  years  of  Washington's  begging  and 
pleading,  we  now  had  about  one-third  the 
number  of  men  with  which  we  had  begun  the 
war.  It  means  something  more :  Altogether 
we  had  employed  near  400,000.  Eliminating 
possible  killed  and  wounded,  it  means  that 
many  thousands  of  the  volunteers  who  began 
fighting  simply  got  tired  and  quit — with  their 
bounties,  perhaps  more  than  300,000  of  them. 
Think  of  that,  300,000  soldiers  of  the  young 
republic  who  had  once  been  under  arms, 
had  now  quietly  retired  to  their  homes  be- 
cause they  were  willing  to  fight  no  longer. 


[53] 


THE  LITTLE  WE  LEARNED  AND  THE 
MUCH  WE  DIDN'T 

MY  son,  we  ought  to  have  learned  something 
from  all  this  tragedy  of  errors.  We  didn't. 
Folks  just  said,  "We  licked  the  entire  British 
Empire, ' '  and  let  it  go  at  that.  The  real  facts 
never  leaked  into  their  noggins,  that  the  Rev- 
olution had  been  prolonged  to  eight  disas- 
trous years,  when  by  the  intelligent  and  com- 
pact use  of  our  resources,  it  might  have  been 
[54] 


Little  We  Learned  and  Much  We  Didn't 

ended  by  a  single  campaign.  Of  course  a  few 
men — mighty  scarce  and  nobody  listened — 
a  few  men  sat  down  and  figured  out  the  rea- 
sons. Of  course  the  Continental  Congress 
was  not  to  blame  for  the  errors  and  left- 
handed  inefficiencies  of  our  military  estab- 
lishment. As  I  told  you  before,  the  Conti- 
nental Congress  had  no  power  to  raise  a  dol- 
lar or  to  enlist  a  man.  It  was  nothing  but  a 
sterilized  debating  society,  with  power  to  say 
"Whereas"  and  "Besolved"  and  "Will  you 
please"  to  the  sovereign  states.  But  the 
Federal  Constitution,  adopted  in  March,  1789, 
gave  to  the  Congress  of  the  young  republic 
a  giant's  authority  to  raise  and  support  arm- 
ies, to  provide  and  maintain  a  navy,  to  levy 
taxes;  so  your  Uncle  Samuel  is  now  clothed 
with  every  war  power  that  the  most  despotic 
emperor  could  ask.  Whatever  now  goes 
wrong  with  our  scheme  of  national  defense 
is  directly  chargeable  to  the  United  States 
Congress — and  to  your  Uncle  Samuel.  But, 
my  son,  remember  this  and  never  forget,  that 
neither  Congress  nor  Uncle  Sam  can  turn  a 
[55] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

wheel  unless  we  are  backed  up  by  public  sen- 
timent. It's  the  public  sentiment  of  the  coun- 
try which  makes  Congress  act.  That's  why  I 
am  so  anxious  to  have  all  the  country  folks 
and  all  the  city  folks  know  exactly  where  we 
stand.  There 's  no  forty-seven  different  ways 
about  what  we've  got  to  do.  Do  you  suppose 
I'm  talking  to  you  just  to  hear  my  tongue  rat- 
tle? No,  siree.  I'm  busier  than  a  bumblebee 
in  a  bucket  of  tar,  but  can't  accomplish  a 
thing  unless  the  people  get  busy,  too.  Our 
folks  have  got  plenty  of  sense  if  we  can  just 
make  them  dive  down  in  their  think-tanks  and 
use  it. 

It's  as  plain  as  the  nose  on  your  face  what 
we  should  have  learned  from  the  Eevolution : 

First:  That  nearly  all  the  dangers  that 
threatened  the  cause  of  independence  may 
be  traced  to  the  total  inexperience  of  our 
statesmen  in  regard  to  military  affairs,  which 
led  to  vital  mistakes  in  army  legislation. 

Second :  That,  for  waging  war,  a  Confed- 
eration is  the  weakest  of  all  governments. 

Third :  That  neither  voluntary  enlistments 
[56] 


Little  We  Learned  and  Much  We  Didn't 

based  on  patriotism,  nor  a  bounty,  can  be  re- 
lied upon  to  supply  men  for  a  prolonged  war. 

Fourth:  That  the  draft,  selective  or  not 
selective,  with  voluntary  enlistments  and 
bounties,  is  the  only  sure  reliance  of  the  gov- 
ernment in  time  of  war. 

Fifth :  That  short  enlistments  are  destruc- 
tive of  discipline,  tend  to  disgust  men  with 
the  service,  and  force  the  government  to  re- 
sort to  either  a  bounty  or  the  draft. 

Sixth:  That  when  a  nation  attempts  to 
combat  disciplined  troops  with  raw  levies,  it 
must  maintain  an  army  of  at  least  twice  the 
size  of  the  enemy,  and  even  then  have  no 
guarantee  of  success. 

These  facts  are  the  A.  B.  C.  of  military 
horse  sense — and  likewise  the  X.  Y.  Z. 

The  Continental  government  acted  without 
foresight  in  creating  a  system  of  volunteer 
militia,  and  the  new  Federal  government  dis- 
played no  hindsight  by  continuing  it.  Look- 
ing backward,  and  with  complete  power  to 
remedy  evils,  it  disbanded  our  regular  army 
— except  80  men — and  raised  700  men  to  serve 
[57] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

for  one  year.  Bevolutionary  failures  had 
taught  nothing  to  the  Congress  which  re- 
fused to  be  weaned  away  from  its  militia  de- 
lusion. 

By  this  time,  my  son,  you  must  have  grown 
tired  of  hearing  about  our  militia  fading 
away  into  thin  mists  when  confronted  by  the 
rock-like  ranks  of  regular  troops.  But 
doesn't  it  give  you  a  pain  to  know  that  they 
did  precisely  the  same  thing  when  Lo,  the 
poor  Indian,  let  loose  a  war  whoop?  Our 
first  military  expedition  after  the  Revolution 
was  led  by  General  Joseph  Harmar  against 
the  Miami  Indians — 320  regulars  and  1,133 
militia.  Sixty  regulars  and  330  militia  at- 
tacked the  Indian  village,  losing  183  killed  and 
31  wounded.  The  humiliating  details  were 
developed  at  the  coroner's  inquest — other- 
wise called  Congressional  investigation.  Con- 
gress had  a  way  of  probing  calamities  after 
their  occurrence,  instead  of  preventing  them 
in  advance.  Naturally  they  probed  General 
Harmar 's  conduct,  and  judicially  determined 
that  ''amongst  the  militia  were  a  great  many 
T58] 


Little  We  Learned  and  Much  We  Didn't 

hardly  able  to  bear  arms,  such  as  old,  infirm 
men,  and  young  boys ;  they  were  not  such  as 
might  be  expected  from  a  frontier;  viz., 
strong,  active  woodsmen  well  accustomed  to 
arms,  eager  and  alert  to  avenge  injuries 
done. ' '  Also,  many  of  the  militia  were  sub- 
stitutes. 

Congress  utterly  failed  to  detect  the  milk  in 
the  cocoanut,  that  even  if  the  men  had  been 
"active  woodsmen  well  accustomed  to  arms," 
without  discipline  they  might  be  worthless 
as  soldiers.  A  few  months  later  4,000  of  such 
woodsmen  actually  ran  away  from  a  prairie 
fire. 


[59J 


XI 


LO,  THE  IMPOLITE  INDIAN 

WHILE  investigating  the  preventable  trag- 
edy of  Harmar,  everybody  did  a  lot  of  talk- 
ing— according  to  Congressional  precedent. 
The  evidence  showed  that  on  attacking  the 
village  the  "  militia  behaved  badly,  disobeyed 
orders,  and  left  the  regular  troops  to  be  sac- 
rificed." The  Investigating  Committee  after 
weighing  all  testimony  finally  and  solemnly 
concluded  "that  the  conduct  of  the  said  Brig- 
[60] 


Lo,  the  Impolite  Indian 


adier  General  Joseph  A.  Hannar  merits  our 
approbation."  I  wonder  what  the  183  dead 
men  thought  about  it. 

It  would  seem  that  foresights  and  hind- 
sights, working  together  would  sidetrack  any 
future  chance  for  such  a  catastrophe.  Not  a 
bit.  One  year  later  the  same  thing  happened, 
only  worse.  General  St.  Clair,  with  1,400 
regulars  and  militia,  was  attacked  by  a  nearly 
equal  force  of  Indians,  and  routed.  Think 

of  that,  by  a  nearly  equal  force.  They  were 
not  overpowered,  not  outnumbered.  Man  to 
man  the  Indians  beat  the  militia,  St.  Glair's 
army  was  destroyed,  with  a  loss  of  632  killed 
and  264  wounded,  which  exceeds  the  total 
killed  at  the  battles  of  Long  Island  and  Cam- 
den,  the  two  bloodiest  affairs  of  the  Revolu- 
tionary War.  This  wasn't  a  fight,  it  was  a 
massacre. 

The  House  of  Representatives  immediately 
appointed  another  committee  for  another  in- 
vestigation. Foreseeing  the  future  after  it 
had  occurred,  this  Committee  reported  that 
"the  militia  appeared  to  have  been  composed 
[61] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

principally  of  substitutes,  totally  ungoverna- 
ble, regardless  of  military  duty  and  subordi- 
nation. ' ' 

That  was  no  news.  Our  militia  had  rarely 
been  anything  else.  They  were  individual 
Americans.  But  Congress  added  an  apology 
which  explained  everything:  "The  attack 
was  unexpected,  the  troops  having  just  been 
dismissed  from  morning  parade.  The  militia 
were  in  advance  and  fled  through  the  main 
army  without  firing  a  gun.  This  circum- 
stance threw  the  troops  into  some  disorder, 
from  which  it  appears  that  they  never  re- 
covered. ' '  Under  such  plainly  mitigating  cir- 
cumstances the  militiamen  pleaded  that  the 
Indians  had  attacked  unexpectedly,  as  In- 
dians had  no  legal  right  to  do.  Indians  are 
not  submarines.  Nobody  was  looking  for 
Indians.  Nobody  was  thinking  of  Indians. 
Nobody  was  meddling  with  Indians.  A  per- 
fectly nice  Indian  should  never  jump  on  a 
mob  of  substitutes  just  after  they  had  been 
dismissed  from  morning  parade.  And  the 
militia,  strictly  according  to  Hoyle,  turned 
[62] 


Lo,  the  Impolite  Indian 


tail  without  firing,  and  ran  backward  through 
the  regulars.  The  Congressional  Report  con- 
cludes with:  "In  justice  to  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  we  say  that  the  failure  of  the 
late  expedition  can  in  no  respect  be  imputed 
to  his  conduct,  either  at  any  time  before,  or 
during  the  action."  It  became  quite  a  con- 
ventional phrase  to  speak  of  any  militia  ex- 
pedition as  "the  late  expedition." 

Now  it  was  squarely  up  to  Congress  to  do 
something,  and  Congress  did. 

My  son,  did  you  ever  observe  a  dominecker 
hen  setting  on  a  china  doorknob?  Ever  try 
to  argue  with  her?  It's  no  use.  She  will  get 
off  the  nest,  scratch  gravel  backwards,  turn 
over  the  doorknob,  investigate — investigate, 
and  go  to  setting  some  more.  Isn't  she  the 
perforated  pattern  of  undiscouraged  opti- 
mism? Well,  Congress  was  just  that  stubborn 
about  trying  to  hatch  a  brood  of  winners 
from  this  volunteer  militia  egg.  Having  of- 
ficially settled  the  fact  that  the  militia  was  an 
insubordinate,  undisciplined  and  ineffective 
force,  they  immediately  set  to  work — to  break 
[63] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

it  up?  Oh  dear,  no.  They  built  it  up.  They 
made  it  bigger  and  clumsier  and  worse.  As 
the  militia  method  was  so  bad  to  begin  with, 
they  went  the  limit,  and  converted  everybody 
into  militiamen.  By  Act  of  May  8,  1792, 
every  free,  able-bodied  white  male  citizen  be- 
tween the  ages  of  18  and  45,  was  required  to 
be  enrolled  in  the  militia  of  the  United  States, 
and  served  with  notice  of  his  enrollment. 
After  that,  every  citizen  should,  within  six 
months,  provide  himself  with  a  good  musket, 
or  firelock,  a  sufficient  bayonet  and  belt,  two 
soft  flints,  and  a  knapsack,  a  pouch  with  a  box 
therein  to  contain  not  less  than  24  cartridges 
suited  to  the  bore  of  his  musket,  etc.,  etc. 
Ah  ha!  Congress  is  learning;  they  specify 
by  law  that  the  cartridge  should  fit  the  gun. 
It  now  becomes  the  citizen's  duty  to  appear 
for  exercise  or  duty  when  called  upon.  How- 
ever cumbersome  this  legal  contraption,  it 
was  the  first  step  ever  taken  by  the  United 
States  Government  towards  universal  mili- 
tary service. 

One  glaring  defect  of  the  law — if  your  Un- 
[64] 


Lo,  the  Impolite  Indian 


cle  Samuel  may  be  respectfully  permitted  to 
select  any  particular  defect — was  that  it  left 
the  militia  at  the  command  of  the  state  gov- 
ernments. This  statute  remained  dead  on  the 
statute  books,  there  being  no  penalties  pro- 
vided for  its  violation. 

Instead  of  creating  one  efficient  national 
army,  we  became  possessed  of  thirteen  inde- 
pendent and  disconnected  state  mobs.  But  it 
was  a  beautifully  free  mob  of  freeborn  citi- 
zens. They  could  either  get  together  and  act 
as  mob  if  they  chose,  or  they  could  remain  at 
home.  There  was  no  method  of  forcing  them. 

On  this  occasion  I  rise  to  remark :  We  must 
not  forget  that  certain  provision  in  the  first 
section  of  the  act  which  laid  down  the  truly 
democratic  doctrine  that  every  able-bodied 
male  citizen  owes  military  service  to  his  coun- 
try. 

It  further  provided  for  a  system  of  enroll- 
ment and  territorial  recruiting.  All  the  rest 
of  the  law  was  bad,  hopelessly  bad. 

As  a  balm  laid  upon  the  soreness  of  Har- 
mar's  and  St.  Glair's  defeats,  in  June,  1795, 
[65] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

General  Wayne  attacked  and  dispersed  the 
Miami  Indians.  But  in  his  force  there  was 
a  very  large  preponderance  of  disciplined 
regulars,  and  it  was  their  attack  with  the  bay- 
onet which  scattered  the  savages. 


[66] 


xn 

GEORGE'S  PET 

MY  son,  I  was  speaking  to  you  awhile  ago 
about  George  Washington.  Well,  George  had 
a  pet  scheme  in  the  back  part  of  his  head,  the 
foundation  of  a  Military  Academy.  Only 
three  days  before  his  death  he  wrote  to  Alex- 
ander Hamilton :  ' '  The  establishment  of  an 
institution  of  this  kind  has  ever  been  consid- 
ered by  me  as  an  object  of  primary  impor- 
tance for  this  country.  When  I  was  in  the 
[67] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

chair  of  Government  I  omitted  no  proper  op- 
portunity of  recommending  it."  Mr.  Mc- 
Henry,  Secretary  of  War  in  1805,  submitted 
his  views  to  Congress  and  said:  "It  cannot 
be  forgotten  that  in  our  Revolutionary  War  it 
was  not  until  after  several  years '  practice 
with  arms,  that  our  soldiers  became  at  all 
qualified  to  meet  on  the  field  of  battle  those 
to  whom  they  were  opposed.  Occasional  bril- 
liant and  justly  celebrated  acts  of  some  of  our 
militia  detract  nothing  from  this  dearly 
bought  truth." 

By  Act  of  1805  Congress  authorized  the 
President  to  establish  a  Corps  of  Engineers, 
with  a  cadre  of  not  over  20  officers  and  ca- 
dets, "which  shall  be  stationed  at  West  Point 
in  the  State  of  New  York,  and  shall  constitute 
a  Military  Academy." 

Mighty  small  potatoes  to  begin  with,  but  it 
grew. 

During  this  period  between  the  Revolution 
and  the  War  of  1812  we  had  the  Shay  Rebel- 
lion, the  Whiskey  Rebellion,  complications 
with  England  and  also  with  the  Republic  of 
[68] 


George's  Pet 


France.  Congress  appropriated  money  to 
fortify  the  coast  and  authorized  the  Presi- 
dent to  raise  a  provincial  army  of  10,000 
men,  in  case  of  a  declaration  of  war  against 
the  United  States.  They  meant  to  wait,  how- 
ever, until  war  was  actually  declared  against 
us.  This  army  was  never  called  into  service. 
Later  on  further  preparations  were  made  for 
conflict  with  Great  Britain,  but  Congress, 
with  full  power  to  maintain  a  real  army,  still 
clung  to  its  militia  delusion,  and  even  ree'n- 
acted  the  odious  and  ineffective  bounty  pro- 
visions. 

Bounty  attractions  drew  precisely  the  same 
results — or  rather  lack  of  results.  The  army, 
which  in  1810  numbered  2,765,  had  only  in- 
creased to  6,686  in  July,  1812.  On  paper  we 
were  supposed  to  muster  35,603  men.  It 
passes  human  belief  that  our  muddle-headed 
mistakes  should  be  repeated  and  made  more 
glaring  by  a  return  to  short-term  enlistments 
so  appalling  in  the  Eevolution.  But  that  is 
exactly  what  Congress  did,  by  reducing  the 
term  of  enlistment  from  five  years  to  18 
[69] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

months.  As  a  further  and  ghastlier  joke  the 
President  was  empowered  to  require  the  gov- 
ernors of  the  States  to  hold  in  readiness  to 
march  at  a  moment's  notice  a  detachment  of 
militia  not  exceeding  80,000  officers  and  men. 
The  trouble  is  that  such  militia  marched  back- 
wards much  more  fluently  than  they  ever  ad- 
vanced forward.  I'm  going  to  tell  you  more 
about  this  presently,  the  harrowing  story  of 
how  the  capital  of  this  nation  fell. 

When  our  relations  with  England  and 
France  were  such  that  we  only  maintained 
an  army  of  2,000  to  3,000  men,  it  did  not  need 
officers.  And  for  a  dead  certainty  we  did  not 
have  them.  But  when  war  stared  us  again  in 
the  face  it  was  more  than  criminal  neglect  to 
find  that  after  25  years  of  independence  we 
were  entering  another  great  struggle  with  of- 
ficers scarcely  more  efficient  than  those  whom 
Washington  had  deplored  in  the  first  years  of 
the  Eevolution.  Up  to  1812  only  71  cadets 
had  graduated  from  the  Military  Academy. 

Then,  although  we  had  been  expecting  it  for 
[70] 


George's  Pet 


fourteen  years,  the  War  of  1812  sneaked  up 
behind  us.  Remember  the  ostrich? 

Whether  we  saw  it  coming  or  not,  we  had 
another  big  war  on  our  hands.  In  spite  of 
the  fact  that  six  months  previously  Congress 
had  increased,  on  paper,  the  regular  estab- 
lishment to  35,000  men,  only  6,744  were  actu- 
ally present  and  ready  for  service. 

Manifestly  if  we  were  going  to  strike  Eng- 
land it  must  be  through  Canada.  Our  Secre- 
tary of  War  gained  the  information  that 
Great  Britain's  regular  forces  in  Canada  did 
not  exceed  6,000  men.  Reliable  English  writ- 
ers of  the  time  say  that  their  force  numbered 
4,450,  largely  composed  "of  old  men  and  in- 
valids fit  only  for  barracks  duty."  My  son, 
I  don't  know  exactly  what  they  were  fit  for, 
but  they  were  fit.  I  can  prove  that  by  various 
American  expeditions  that  were  dispatched 
against  them. 

You  cannot  understand  the  situation  unless 

you  recall  that  we  were  working  under  the 

military  laws  of  May,  1792.    Congress  had  the 

theoretical  right  to  call  together  an  army,  but 

[71] 


The  Unpopidar  History  of  the  United  States 

it  was  like  calling  spirits  from  the  vasty  deep 
— anybody  can  call  the  spirits  but  they  won't 
come. 

The  Governors  of  Massachusetts  and  Con- 
necticut positively  refused  to  furnish  their 
quotas  of  the  100,000  militia  authorized  by 
the  Act  of  April  10, 1812.  They  claimed  that 
state  militia  could  only  be  employed  in  the 
service  of  the  United  States  for  three  pur- 
poses— executing  the  laws  of  the  Union,  sup- 
pressing insurrection,  and  repelling  inva- 
sion. These  governors  wanted  to  know  pre- 
cisely where  their  men  were  to  be  used,  and 
how.  President  Madison  could  not  order  the 
state  militia  into  national  service  without 
forcing  individual  men  to  become  deserters 
from  their  states,  because  the  law  made  no 
exception  if  a  man  left  the  state  service  to 
enter  the  service  of  the  nation.  These  gover- 
nors were  able  to  paralyze  for  the  time  be- 
ing the  military  power  of  their  respective 
states,  and  defeat  the  plans  of  the  general 
government.  Every  wheel  had  to  stop  while 
the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  solemnly  liti- 
[72] 


George's  Pet 


gated  the  wrangle.  This  learned  debate  com- 
plicated the  enlistment  proposition,  and  the 
men  themselves  took  it  up,  discussing  the 
question  at  their  camp  fire  courts.  Presently 
we'll  see  what  effect  this  had  at  Queenstown. 
It  hurts  mightily  to  rake  all  these  skeletons 
out  of  my  family  closet,  but  I  couldn't  stand 
to  look  at  them  if  we  had  not  through  later 
years  absolutely  demonstrated  the  courage 
and  capacity  of  American  volunteers — once 
they  had  been  trained  and  are  under  rigid  dis- 
cipline. I  merely  want  to  impress  upon  you 
the  fact  that  our  boys  need  work  and  steady 
training  before  they're  worth  a  hang  as  sol- 
diers. 


[73] 


xrn 

"ON  TO  CANADA!" 

EVERY  freeborn  American  has  an  inaliena- 
ble and  constitutional  right  to  shoot  off  his 
mouth  whenever  he  gets  ready,  loaded  with 
cannister,  shrapnel  or  blanks — generally 
blanks.  Immediately  the  War  of  1812  broke 
out,  satchel-mouthed  patriots  raised  the  cry 
of  "On  to  Canada  I" 

"On  to  Canada!"  "On  to  Canada!"  they 
shouted  at  every  crossroads  and  every  street 
[741 


On  to  Canada!' 


corner.  Passionate  orators,  who  meant  to 
stay  at  home,  demanded  instant  invasion.  Our 
statesmen  on  the  hill,  profoundly  blind  as  to 
what  was  needed  against  the  disciplined  foe, 
decided  offhand  that  a  small  body  of  volun- 
teers and  militia  would  suffice.  Kittens  get 
their  eyes  open  at  the  end  of  nine  days. 
Statesmen  are  not  kittens. 

General  Isaac  Hull  must  have  known  bet- 
ter. He  was  a  tried  hero  of  the  Eevolution, 
an  experienced  veteran,  and  close  personal 
friend  of  George  Washington.  Yet  in  July, 
General  Hull,  with  a  picked  force  of  300  reg- 
ulars and  1,500  militia  started  "On  to  Can- 
ada ! "  He  crossed  over  from  Detroit  to  the 
Canadian  side.  The  populace  behind  him 
clamored  "On  to  Canada!"  so  General  Hull 
went  on.  But  he  returned  instantly,  without 
inflicting  the  slightest  damage  or  accomplish- 
ing a  solitary  result.  Having  regained  his 
own  side  of  the  river,  he  took  shelter  in  the 
American  fort  at  Detroit.  The  British  force 
could  not  comprehend  his  subtle  strategy.  It 
roused  their  curiosity.  They  wanted  to  find 
[75] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

out  why.  So  the  British  General  Brock,  be- 
ing an  inquisitive  person,  followed  General 
Hull,  invaded  our  territory  and  bottled  up 
Hull  in  his  fort  at  Detroit.  Now  remember,  my 
son,  General  Hull  lay  snug,  in  a  well  fortified 
position,  with  some  1,800  men.  The  British 
commander  having  landed  on  American  soil, 
with  1,320  men,  refused  to  believe  his  own 
eyes  when  the  Americans  hoisted  a  white  flag 
over  their  fort,  and  surrendered  a  superior 
force  inside  to  an  inferior  force  outside — 
and  without  even  popping  a  cap.  By  this  fi- 
asco we  Americans  lost  control  of  the  entire 
northwest  country,  together  with  all  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  initiative,  which  passed  into 
British  hands.  Furthermore,  their  unex- 
pected and  easy  success  brought  to  the  Brit- 
ish standard  nearly  every  Indian  in  all  that 
region. 

My  son,  what  are  you  beginning  to  think 
about  this  proposition  of  a  single-handed 
American  farmer  licking  ten  of  any  other  na- 
tion on  the  globe? 

Eemember  this  British  officer's  name,  Gen- 
[76] 


On  to  Canada! '" 


eral  Brock.  You'll  hear  of  Mm  again.  At 
that  time  he  had  only  1,320  regulars.  Yet  he 
very  easily  got  Detroit,  and  the  whole  north- 
western country,  for  a  Christmas  gift.  Pres- 
ently we  shall  count  the  cost,  in  men  and 
money,  to  dislodge  the  redcoats. 

What  a  howl  went  up  from  "On  to  Can- 
ada!" promoters.  Every  crossroads  oracle 
expressed  his  opinion,  his  personal  opinion. 
They  accused  General  Hull  of  treason,  they 
charged  him  with  cowardice,  they  called  him 
bad  names,  and  convened  a  court  martial  to 
prove  it.  In  spite  of  the  Bevomtionary 
hero's  vigorous  defense,  the  court  martial 
actually  convicted  him  of  cowardice,  although 
acquitting  him  of  the  treason. 

How  did  General  Hull  explain  it?  By  say- 
ing that  he  began  his  march  with  the  Fourth 
United  States  Eegiment,  consisting  of  300  ef- 
fective men,  and  was  joined  by  1,200  militia 
at  Urbana.  "After  the  disposition  was  made 
for  the  march,  I  was  informed  that  part  of  the 
militia  refused  to  obey  the  order.  I  directed 
their  own  officers  to  give  them  positive  orders 
[77] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

to  march,  and  informed  them  if  they  did  not 
obey,  the  Fourth  United  States  Eegiment 
would  be  sent  to  compel  them.  They  still  re- 
fused, and  a  part  of  the  Fourth  Eegiment  was 
marched  to  their  station.  Then  they  obeyed. ' ' 

Fair-minded  men  were  convinced  that 
Hull's  surrender  was  caused  by  the  fact  that 
the  larger  portion  of  his  recruits  were  unfit, 
unreliable  and  insubordinate.  A  mutinous 
spirit  prevailed  among  the  men,  the  authority 
of  their  officers  was  not  sufficient  to  command 
obedience,  and  nothing  but  the  bayonets  of 
the  Fourth  Regular  Eegiment  could  have  any 
effect. 

It  was  considered  that  General  Hull's  long 
and  disheartening  experience  with  raw  mi- 
litia preyed  upon  his  mind  and  might  possi- 
bly have  caused  him  to  surrender  when  there 
was  no  real  necessity.  If  so,  what  a  travesty, 
that  the  gray-haired  and  gallant  officer  should 
be  placed  in  such  position. 

Were  it  not  so  humiliating,  the  details  of 
this  blunder  would  be  amusing.  One  hundred 
and  eighty  of  Hull's  recruits,  who  had  so 
[78] 


On  to  Canada!' 


gayly  started  "On  to  Canada!"  balked  at 
their  own  side  of  the  river,  because  it  was  un- 
constitutional for  militia  to  serve  outside  the 
United  States,  which  recalls  the  sensible  old 
song, 

"Mother,  may  I  go  in  to  swim? 

Yes,  my  darling  daughter. 
Hang  your  clothes  on  a  hickory  limb, 

But  don't  go  near  the  water." 

That's  an  American  joke  and  everybody 
can  understand  it.  But  what  the  British  did 
to  the  recruits  who  were  captured  was  no  joke 
to  Americans.  General  Brock  added  the 
stinging  insult  to  Hull's  surrender  by  send- 
ing all  United  States  regulars  as  prisoners  to 
Montreal.  The  volunteers  and  militia  he  sim- 
ply turned  loose.  Why  shouldn't  he  turn 
loose  such  harmless  persons?  Volunteers 
and  militia  were  utterly  useless  to  their  own 
government,  constituted  no  peril  to  the  Brit- 
ish, and  were  not  worth  feeding  in  captivity. 
This  contempt  subsequently  reacted  upon  the 
British  at  New  Orleans. 
[79] 


XIV 
THE  PEAIEIE  FIRE  PANIC 

Huu/s  inglorious  finish  riled  the  Ameri- 
cans. They  got  their  dander  up,  especially 
some  high-tempered  mountaineers  in  Tennes- 
see and  Kentucky,  where  General  Hopkins 
raised  4,000  mounted  militia.  They  treated 
America  to  the  spectacle  of  a  genuine  rush — 
the  real  thing — a  rush  which  measured  up  to 
every  optimistic  prediction  of  those  who 
placed  their  faith  in  militia — 4,000  fiery  cava- 
[80] 


The  Prairie  Fire  Panic 


liers,  " smart  and  active  woodsmen,"  eager 
for  revenge,  sniffing  the  battle  from  afar — 
4,000  mounted  frontiersmen  rode,  furiously, 
upon  what  developed  into  the  wittiest  cam- 
paign of  any  war — if  brevity  be  the  soul  of 
wit.  Their  whirlwind  campaign  lasted  five 
days.  Once  on  the  march  the  ardor  of  the 
troops  began  to  cool,  and  the  leaven  of  mu- 
tiny wrought  disintegration.  On  the  fourth 
day  a  prairie  fire  was  mistaken  for  some 
cunning  ruse  of  the  enemy.  Panic-stricken  and 
totally  ignoring  the  authority  of  their  officers, 
the  disorderly  rabble  abandoned  their  jour- 
ney. Incredible  as  it  may  sound,  it  is  yet  the 
sober  truth,  that  4,000  hardy  pioneers  scur- 
ried back  again  to  their  mountains,  hysterical- 
ly frightened  by  an  anonymous  and  serenely 
innocent  prairie  fire.  Their  officers  ordered 
and  pleaded  and  raved  and  swore;  nothing 
could  stop  such  an  unreasoning  and  undisci- 
plined rabble. 

Every  fellow  for  himself,  and  the  devil  take 
the  hindmost,  they  scattered  to  their  homes, 
each  with  a  gory  and  imaginative  tale  to  tell. 
[81] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

This  is  just  another  illustration  of  individual 
initiative — working  backwards. 

It  is  perfectly  possible  to  take  a  thousand 
individuals,  each  of  whom  is  individually 
fearless,  form  them  hastily  into  a  regiment, 
and  collectively  they  will  not  stand  fire.  A 
thousand  individual  heroes  may  easily  make 
one  collective  regimental  coward.  Such  is  the 
incomprehensible  psychology  of  the  mob. 

But  the  point  to  be  emphasized  is  this: 
Nobody  seemed  to  learn  anything  from  these 
staggering  stampedes.  Even  General  Wil- 
liam Henry  Harrison,  who  had  sense  enough 
to  become  President  of  the  United  States 
some  years  later,  tried  his  hand  at  the  same 
game.  He  selected  another  army  for  the  ex- 
press, sworn  and  heralded  purpose  of  wip- 
ing out  the  stain  of  Hull's  surrender.  Again 
it  was  militia — frontiersmen — from  Ken- 
tucky, Virginia,  Tennessee,  Pennsylvania. 
Volunteers  surged  forward  with  the  greatest 
enthusiasm,  and  offered  themselves  in  such 
numbers  that  General  Harrison  could  only 
take  a  chosen  few,  and  leave  the  disappointed 
[82] 


The  Prairie  Fire  Panic 


many.  These  were  not  old  men  and  weak- 
lings and  substitutes ;  they  were  Indian-fight- 
ing sons  of  the  border — stout  bodies  and 
brave  souls,  but  undisciplined. 

The  militia  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  as- 
sembled at  Louisville  and  Newport;  those 
from  Virginia  mobilized  at  Urbana ;  and  the 
Pennsylvania  crowd  gathered  at  Erie.  They 
were  to  march  in  three  columns  with  a  sup- 
posed total  of  not  less  than  ten  thousand  men. 
Think  of  it!  Ten  thousand  Daniel  Boones, 
Simon  Kentons  and  Buffalo  Bills!  What 
glory  a  school  boy  would  expect  from  such  an 
expedition,  which  trailed  through  the  forest, 
registering  oaths  against  the  savage  redskins, 
and  swearing  to  make  the  British  sweat  for 
their  capture  of  Detroit. 

It  ended  as  was  foreordained,  in  the  same 
old,  sad  old  way.  No  sooner  had  the  several 
columns  began  to  move  than  they  began  to 
strike  the  truly  American  stumbling  blocks  of 
mutiny  and  disobedience.  Eaw  militia  stand 
hard  work  with  no  better  grace  than  they 
will  stand  a  steady  hammering.  The  left 
[83] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

column  from  Kentucky,  when  only  a  few  days 
out,  had  to  be  argued  and  pleaded  with,  re- 
maining only  in  response  to  the  personal  en- 
treaties of  General  Harrison.  The  middle  col- 
umn, from  Urbana,  after  a  slight  skirmish 
with  Indians,  flatly  refused  to  obey  orders  for 
a  further  pursuit,  and  returned  to  their  camp. 
This  ended  the  autumn  campaign,  and  repre- 
sented the  total  accomplishments  of  ten  thou- 
sand men,  frontiersmen  at  that,  engaged  in 
the  very  kind  of  warfare  for  which  they  were 
supposed  to  be  peculiarly  adapted.  Once 
again  they  demonstrated  the  undependable- 
ness  of  men  who  were  not  trained  to  control 
and  obedience,  no  matter  what  may  be  their 
patriotism  and  courage.  Nothing,  absolutely 
nothing,  was  done  until  January  22,  1813, 
when  a  forward  movement  under  General 
Winchester  was  defeated  and  captured  at 
Frenchtown  with  a  loss  of  397  killed,  27 
wounded  and  526  prisoners.  The  British 
force  was  the  same  that  had,  under  General 
Brock,  captured  Detroit,  and  were  now  com- 
manded by  Proctor  who  terrorized  the  north- 
[84] 


The  Prairie  Fire  Panic 


west.  The  American  loss  at  Frenchtown  was 
a  natural  sequence  of  Hull's  surrender,  and 
a  further  installment  of  the  price  that  we 
were  continually  paying  for  the  insubordina- 
tion of  our  militia. 

But,  my  son,  let  me  impress  upon  you,  let 
me  tell  you  over  and  over  again,  the  shame  of 
it  is  that  these  same  militiamen  who  run 
away,  mutiny,  and  surrender,  represent  A 
No.  1  military  material  which  we  lose  for  lack 
of  training,  discipline  and  organization. 

For  a  moment  now  turn  back  to  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war.  You  will  remember  that 
President  Madison  had  an  argument  with  va- 
rious governors  and  lawyers  as  to  whether 
the  state  militia  could  be  employed  outside  of 
the  United  States.  That  powwow  raged  in 
the  capitol  and  continued  in  the  camp,  to  this 
distressing  outcome:  On  October  12,  1812, 
General  Van  Rensselaer,  commanding  900 
regulars  and  2,270  militia,  held  Fort  Niagara ; 
225  American  regulars  crossed  the  river  into 
Canada  and  by  a  brilliant  assault  captured 
the  British  heights  at  Queenstown.  General 
[85] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

Brock,  the  British  commander  who  had  taken 
Detroit,  at  once  saw  the  importance  of  dis- 
lodging these  troops,  and  was  killed  while 
leading  an  unsuccessful  assault.  In  the  mean- 
time most  of  the  militia  detachment  which 
was  to  have  taken  part  of  the  original  move- 
ment, as  well  as  the  remainder  of  the  regu- 
lars, had  crossed  the  Niagara  to  help  defend 
the  heights.  But  the  rest  of  the  militia  on  our 
side  of  the  river,  although  ordered  and  im- 
plored by  their  commander,  absolutely  re- 
fused to  pass  beyond  the  borders  of  the 
United  States.  Stubborn  as  mules,  they  balked 
within  plain  sight  and  watched  their  com- 
rades being  slaughtered,  while  they  debated 
a  high  point  of  law — whereas,  viz,  to  wit: 
whether  or  not  under  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  duly  adopted  in  May,  1787, 
they  as  militiamen  of  the  sovereign  States, 
temporarily  in  the  service  of  the  National 
Government,  could  be  called  out  for  any  ser- 
vice other  than  to  resist  invasion.  Manifestly 
this  was  not  resisting  an  invasion,  they  were 
safely  on  their  own  side  of  the  river,  within 
[86] 


The  Prairie  Fire  Panic 


the  United  States  while  their  friends  and 
kinsmen  beyond  the  river  were  dying  in  for- 
eign territory.  The  militia  won  their  argu- 
ment, while  every  solitary  American  who  had 
already  crossed  the  river  was  either  killed  or 
forced  to  surrender — 250  killed  and  wounded, 
and  700  prisoners.  The  British  lost  16  killed 
and  69  wounded.  The  total  British  force  was 
estimated  at  600  regulars  with  500  militia 
and  Indians.  The  Americans  had  900  regu- 
lars and  2,270  militia. 

A  little  later  Gen.  Proctor,  who  apparently 
succeeded  Gen.  Brock  in  command  of  the  Brit- 
ish, had  penned  up  Gen.  Harrison  in  Fort 
Meigs  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Miami  River. 
Proctor's  983  regulars  and  militia  with 
twelve  hundred  Indians,  occupied  both  banks 
of  the  river.  Twelve  hundred  Kentucky  mi- 
litia under  Gen.  Clay  were  moving  down  the 
Miami  to  Harrison's  support.  Harrison  sent 
orders  for  Clay  to  land  eight  hundred  men  on 
the  west  bank,  spike  the  enemy's  cannon,  and 
return  to  their  boats — which  eight  hundred 
Americans  easily  accomplished.  But  instead 
[87] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

of  returning  to  their  boats,  they  stormed  the 
British  camp — result:  45  killed,  605  prison- 
ers, 150  escaped.  The  other  detachment, 
thanks  to  a  vigorous  sortie  by  the  regulars, 
succeeded  in  entering  the  fort.  One-half  the 
command  had  been  lost  by  disobedience  and 
individual  initiative. 

One  bright  spot  showed  in  the  whole  cam- 
paign. Fort  Stephenson  was  garrisoned  by 
160  American  regulars,  under  command  of 
Major  Croghan,  a  lad  of  less  than  twenty-one. 
Through  his  successes  Proctor  had  grown  au- 
dacious. He  assaulted  the  fort  with  391  Brit- 
ish regulars,  losing  96.  The  garrison  casual- 
ties were  1  killed  and  7  slightly  wounded. 
Why  the  difference?  Easy  to  answer.  Ma- 
jor Croghan 's  Americans  were  regulars,  and 
knew  how  to  obey. 

There  is  no  sense  in  piling  up  instances. 
The  War  of  1812  bristled  with  calamities 
caused  by  our  'unmanageable,  disorganized 
and  inefficient  militia.  Throughout  that  war 
the  British  regulars  held  Canada  with  prob- 
ably 5,000  men.  Against  them  we  sent  expe- 
[88] 


The  Prairie  Fire  Panic 


dition  after  expedition,  losing  5,614  in  killed 
and  wounded — 614  more,  possibly  a  thousand 
more — than  the  entire  British  force,  and  we 
never  budged  them.  They  continued  to  hold 
Canada.  Undisciplined  courage  hurled  itself 
in  vain  against  their  organized  and  immova- 
ble ranks. 


[89] 


XV 

THE  TIN  HORN  DEFENSE 

LOOKING  back  at  our  catalogue  of  adversi- 
ties, I  get  mighty  darn  hot  in  the  collar  to 
hear  some  well-meaning  and  loudly-vocal 
person  go  careering  around  the  country  and 
orate  as  per  this  formula:  "Should  foreign 
hirelings  assail  the  integrity  of  this  Repub- 
lic, one  blast  upon  the  bugle  trump  of  Free- 
dom and  a  million  patriots  will  spring  to 
arms  over  night  I"  Spring  to  arms.  What 
[90] 


The  Tin  Horn  Defense 


arms?  Where?  Not  this  Spring.  But  the 
worst  of  it  is  that  thousands  of  sensible  folks 
believe  that  rot.  It's  a  shame  to  puncture 
such  a  pretty  noise,  but  in  1814  this  bugle 
trump  experiment — this  tin  horn  scheme  of 
defense — was  actually  tested.  A  British 
fleet  carrying  3,000  troops  threatened  Wash- 
ington City.  On  July  4  President  Madison 
sounded  the  bugle  trump,  day  of  all  days 
when  Freedom's  blast  should  have  been  heard 
and  answered  by  Freedom's  warriors.  Va- 
rious governors  were  ordered  "to  hold  in 
readiness  for  immediate  service  a  corps  of 
93,500."  We  had  these  warriors  on  paper, 
upwards  of  ninety  thousand,  and  their  num- 
bers seemed  exuberantly  ample  to  beat  off 
3,000  regulars.  Besides,  we  had  the  bugle 
trump.  Yet,  heedless  of  that  talismanic  blast, 
the  redcoats  landed.  On  August  24th  every 
solitary  mother's  son  of  our  93,500  warriors 
sprang  to  arms — every  one  of  them,  except 
88,099.  For  defense  of  the  Capital,  5,041  men 
actually  assembled,  without  organization, 
discipline  or  skilled  leadership.  To  render 
[91] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

the  spectacle  more  splendidly  humiliating, 
President  Madison  and  his  Cabinet  rode  out 
to  witness  the  battle  of  Bladensburg. 

The  British  only  employed  1,500  men,  but 
they  were  trained  men;  1,500  real  soldiers 
marched  through  our  paper  forces  of  93,500, 
just  as  if  they  had  been  paper — wet  tissue 
paper.  After  a  loss  of  eight  men  killed  and 
eleven  wounded,  Freedom's  warriors  scat- 
tered, abandoning  their  Capital  to  the  British 
torch,  and  yet,  according  to  most  conserva- 
tive estimates,  our  5,401  patriots  should  have 
easily  licked  a  hireling  army  of  54,000  men. 

Remember,  this  British  fleet  had  been  hov- 
ering along  the  Chesapeake  for  more  than  a 
year.  Congress  had  ample  time  to  get  ready, 
and  Congress  possessed  unlimited  power  to 
raise  armies.  Yet  the  administration  paid 
no  attention  to  the  danger  until  June.  Then 
they  began  to  inquire  of  each  other  through 
the  routine  red  tape  channels,  <rWhat  force 
have  we!"  Answer,  returning  by  devious 
paths,  "2,208  men,"  mostly  recruits,  dis- 
[92] 


The  Tin  Horn  Defense 


persed  at  various  points  along  the  Chesa- 
peake, from  Baltimore  to  Norfolk. 

My  son,  we  've  tried  the  bugle-trump  and  it 
gives  me  a  shiver  to  think  of  relying  wholly 
upon  such  a  tin  horn  scheme  of  defense.  It's 
just  a  little  worse  than  the  ten-to-one  shot. 

After  the  capture  and  burning  of  Washing- 
ton had  been  so  smoothly  accomplished,  our 
people  got  wrathy,  and  howled.  The  Secre- 
tary of  War  was  chased  out  of  the  Capital, 
and  not  permitted  to  return,  even  for  the 
pious  purpose  of  handing  in  his  most  urgently 
demanded  resignation.  Washington  City  had 
fallen,  and  the  popular  indignation  fell  upon 
the  Secretary.  It  was  possibly  no  more  his 
fault  than  the  surrender  of  Detroit  had  been 
the  fault  of  General  Hull.  He  had  relied  upon 
the  state  governors  to  send  93,500  militia  to 
protect  the  National  Capital.  But  the  93,500 
didn't  come.  As  a  result  of  his  depending 
upon  a  rush  of  patriots  who  failed  to  rush, 
the  Secretary  was  compelled  to  fly,  "hissed 
and  hunted"  to  his  home  in  Virginia. 

Now,  let's  skip  a  lot  of  bungles,  and  go 


[93] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

south,  to  something  that  looks  better,  the  bat- 
tle of  New  Orleans. 

At  Bunker  Hill,  if  you  remember,  our  farm- 
ers fired  from  behind  rail  breastworks  and 
justified  Israel  Putnam's  prediction  that 
"these  Americans  will  fight  forever  if  you 
protect  their  legs."  At  New  Orleans  our  po- 
sition was  far  stronger,  a  line  of  defense  well 
chosen  and  fortified  by  impervious  cotton 
bales.  Yet  British  officers  and  regulars  had 
acquired  such  contempt  for  our  militia  that 
General  Pakenham  ordered  the  impossible. 
Long  afterwards  a  British  officer  told  me 
that  if  Pakenham  hadn't  been  killed  he  would 
have  been  courtmartialed  for  his  folly. 

The  British  were  beaten  with  terrific  loss. 
Yet  one  little  fly — the  same  busy  and  buzzing 
little  fly — got  into  the  ointment  of  our  jubi- 
lation. On  the  west  bank  of  the  river  the 
American  breastworks — with  the  exception 
of  a  single  battery  manned  by  sailors — were 
defended  exclusively  by  militia.  At  the  very 
moment  of  a  victory  unparalleled  in  our  his- 
tory, Old  Hickory  had  the  mortification  of 
[94] 


The  Tin  Horn  Defense 


seeing  his  division  on  the  west  bank  "aban- 
don their  position  and  run  in  headlong  flight 
towards  the  city."  Old  Hickory  naturally 
cussed  'em  out  for  their  disobedience,  insub- 
ordination and  cowardice. 

The  Battle  of  New  Orleans  occurred  two 
weeks  after  a  treaty  of  peace  had  been  signed 
at  Ghent,  and  before  the  news  reached  this 
country.  Now  suppose  this  unnecessary  bat- 
tle had  never  been  fought,  my  son,  can  you 
point  to  a  single  big  victory  that  we  gained 
upon  the  land?  Yet  we  outnumbered  the 
British  more  than  32  to  1. 

Our  navy,  on  the  contrary,  waged  a  bold 
and  successful  warfare.  But  they  were  sea- 
faring men,  trained,  skillful  and  obedient.,  All 
of  which  further  emphasizes  the  point  that  I 
have  been  trying  to  make  clear — the  trans- 
formation which  can  be  accomplished  by  dis- 
cipline. 

Let  me  throw  at  you  one  more  big  detail, 

then  I'm  done  with  the  War  of  1812.    In  that 

war,  by  the  same  wasteful  militia  system,  we 

employed  first  and  last  527,654  men — more 

[95] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

than  half  a  million,  which  included  33,481  in- 
experienced officers.  During  1814  alone  we 
paid  for  and  maintained  more  than  235,000 
men  under  arms.  In  contrast  with  our  reck- 
less extravagance  let  me  impress  upon  you  the 
fact  that,  according  to  the  best  figures  obtain- 
able, the  largest  force  of  British  ever  opposed 
to  us  was  16,500.  And  yet  with  all  this  pre- 
ponderance of  numbers — more  than  thirty- 
two  Americans  to  one  British  regular — we 
achieved  only  a  single  decisive  victory  be- 
fore the  treaty  of  peace.  Does  that  sound 
like  Americans  licking  ten  to  one? 

The  solitary  victory  which  we  gained  was 
the  battle  of  the  Thames,  where  the  British 
regulars,  dispersed  and  captured,  numbered 
834;  in  addition  to  this,  General  Proctor — 
the  same  Proctor  who  had  been  raising  so 
much  sand  in  the  northwest — had  a  force  of 
Indians  estimated  at  twelve  hundred.  Thir- 
ty-three of  their  warriors  were  left  dead  on 
the  field,  including  the  famous  Tecumseh, 
General  Harrison  estimated  his  American 
forces  at  a  little  over  three  thousand. 
[96] 


The  Tin  Horn  Defense 


During  this  War  of  1812  no  fewer  than 
5,000  British  soldiers  for  a  period  of  two 
years,  brought  war  and  devastation  into  our 
territory,  and  successfully  withstood  the  mis- 
applied power  of  seven  million  people. 


[971 


XVI 
UNCLE  SAM  COUNTS   THE   COST 

FOLKS  say  that  we  Americans  can  squeeze 
a  dollar  until  the  eagle  squawks.  Maybe  so, 
but  we  begin  squeezing  at  the  wrong  end  of 
the  military  eagle.  For  instance:  What 
do  you  suppose  it  cost  to  disperse  those  800 
British  regulars  who  from  first  to  last  made 
prisoners  of  Hull's  army  at  Detroit,  let  loose 
the  Northwestern  Indians,  routed  and  cap- 
tured Winchester's  command  at  Frenchtown, 
[98] 


Uncle  Sam  Counts  the  Cost 


besieged  Fort  Meigs,  were  repulsed  at  Fort 
Stephenson,  twice  invaded  Ohio,  and  played 
the  devil  generally?  "What  did  it  cost  us  to 
get  rid  of  them?  Tabulated  totals  would 
make  the  tight-fisted  Yankee  squawk.  Here's 
a  rough  estimate  of  the  human  effort:  Be- 
sides our  hastily  organized  and  half  filled  reg- 
iments of  regulars  sent  to  the  West,  about 
50,000  militia  were  called  out  in  the  years  of 
1812  and  1813  from  Ohio,  Tennessee,  Ken- 
tucky, Pennsylvania  and  Virginia — for  serv- 
ice against  those  800  British  regulars.  It 
finally  required  General  Harrison  with  more 
than  three  thousand  men  to  disperse  and  cap- 
ture them  at  the  Battle  of  the  Thames.  All 
of  which  means,  that  during  the  time  they 
were  ravaging  our  country  we  employed  a 
force  of  more  than  sixty  men  against  one — 
and  employed  it  ineffectually  for  upwards  of 
two  years.  This  does  not  include  the  unnec- 
essary loss  of  life,  nor  property  destroyed 
by  the  Brock  and  Proctor  command.  Did  you 
ever  read  that  in  a  popular  school  history? 
Ever  hear  any  Fourth  of  July  orator  tell  that 
[99] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

in  a  frenzied  speech?  No  sir,  no  politician 
would  dare  run  for  constable  on  that  plat- 
form. 

Now,  my  son,  can  you  partially  understand 
why  I  want  to  quit  that  expensive  form  of 
suicide,  and  get  down  to  brass  tacks?  Yet 
our  folks  keep  on  insisting,  "Didn't  we  beat 
the  whole  British  Empire  in  1812?" 

France  helped  us  in  the  Eevolution  and 
helped  us  again  in  1812,  by  making  it  neces- 
sary for  Great  Britain  to  withdraw  her  red- 
coats in  order  to  combat  the  Emperor  Na- 
poleon. The  very  troops  which  Andrew  Jack- 
son defeated,  on  January  8th  at  New  Or- 
leans, were  immediately  transferred  to  the 
fields  of  France  and  contributed  to  Na- 
poleon's downfall  at  Waterloo. 

When  I  sit  down  and  think  it  all  over,  it 
hits  me  square  between  the  eyes  that  we 
Americans  must  be  gluttons  for  punishment. 
Those  nauseous  doses  that  we  were  forced 
to  take  during  the  War  of  1812  ought  to  have 
had  some  effect.  But  Congressmen  can  swal- 
[100] 


Uncle  Sam  Counts  the  Cost 


low  a  heap  of  bad  medicine,  if  they  continue 
to  get  elected  right  straight  along. 

After  the  Kevolution  you  will  remember 
that  all  knowledge  of  the  military  art  was 
practically  extinguished  by  reducing  our 
army  to  eighty  persons,  not  enough  for  supe 
soldiers  in  a  comic  opera. 

After  the  War  of  1812  Congress  provided 
for  a  permanent  peace  establishment  of  10,- 
000  men,  somewhat  more  than  1,000  to  each 
million  of  population  and  fairly  proportioned 
to  the  needs  of  the  country.  Nearly  all  of  its 
higher  grades  were  filled  by  officers  who  had 
acquired  competent  training  in  the  war,  while 
by  the  increase  of  the  Corps  of  Cadets  in  1812, 
the  lower  grades  were  in  future  to  be  filled  by 
young  men  who  had  been  carefully  "  trained 
and  taught  all  the  duties  of  a  private,  non- 
commissioned officer  and  officer."  Since  this 
time,  whenever  our  regular  army  has  met  an 
enemy,  the  conduct  of  officers  and  men  has 
merited  and  received  the  applause  of  their 
countrymen.  More  than  this  it  has  preserved 
to  us  the  military  art. 

[101] 


XVII 
MORE  FIGHTS  FOE  PEACEFUL  FOLK 

MY  son,  you  skirmish  around  the  country 
right  smart  and  you'll  hear  folks  talk  about 
us  being  a  peaceful  people.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  we  have  had  a  tolerable  thick  sprinkling 
of  wars.  The  Seminole  War  broke  out  in 
1817;  the  Black  Hawk  War  in  1832,  and  the 
Florida  War  in  1835. 

Suppose  we  take  a  look  at  that  Florida 
War.  In  1835,  although  our  population  ex- 
[102] 


More  Fights  for  Peaceful  Folk 

ceeded  fifteen  millions,  less  than  4,000  sol- 
diers were  supposed  to  guard  the  sea  coast, 
the  Canadian  frontier,  and  a  vast  territory 
which  swarmed  with  hostile  Indians.  We 
must  have  opened  that  Florida  War  with  a 
left-handed  can  opener,  so  awkwardly  and 
negligently  that  it  spun  out  to  interminable 
length,  with  an  utterly  unnecessary  loss  of 
life  and  property.  Major  Bade  and  his  com- 
mand of  110  men  were  massacred  by  the 
Seminoles;  only  three  escaped.  That  hap- 
pened on  the  28th  day  of  December,  1835. 
The  next  day  General  Clinch,  with  about  200 
regular  troops,  proceeded  to  attack  the  Semi- 
noles on  the  Withlacoochee  Eiver.  Governor 
Call  of  Florida  marched  out  to  help  him,  with 
between  400  and  500  volunteers.  On  Decem- 
ber 31st  General  Clinch  crossed  the  Withla- 
coochee Eiver  and  was  attacked  by  a  large 
body  of  Indians,  whom  he  defeated.  Out  of 
the  200  regulars  67  were  killed  or  wounded, 
including  four  officers — 33^3  per  cent.  What 
about  the  volunteers  f  Of  them  400  or  500  had 
joined  General  Clinch  for  the  avowed  pur- 
[103] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

pose  of  pulverizing  the  Indians,  yet  only  27 
volunteers  and  3  officers  took  part  in  the  en- 
gagement. "Why  so  many  volunteers  re- 
mained out  of  action  is  not  explained.  Had 
they  displayed  the  same  zeal  and  bravery  as 
the  regulars,  the  Seminole  War  would  have 
ended  right  there.  But  it  did  not  end  for 
seven  years. 

Instead  of  employing  regular  soldiers  who 
were  hardened  to  such  work,  the  Secretary  of 
War  ordered  the  Governors  of  South  Caro- 
lina, Georgia  and  Alabama  to  call  out  their 
militia  "to  serve  for  at  least  three  months 
after  arriving  at  the  place  of  rendezvous." 
Year  after  year,  through  war  after  war,  we 
have  repeated  over  and  over  again  the  same 
stupidities  that  have  inevitably  led  to  the 
same  disasters.  We  had  forgotten  the  lessons 
of  the  Revolution,  the  terrible  defeats  of  Har- 
mar  and  St.  Clair,  and  the  monumental  inef- 
ficiency of  our  militia  in  the  war  of  1812. 

The  Seminole  Indians  were  supposed  to 
number  not  more  than  1,200 — or  at  the  wild- 
est guess  2,000 — yet  this  war  dragged  on 
[104] 


More  Fights  for  Peaceful  Folk 

from  1835  to  1842,  during  which  years  we  em- 
ployed 41,122  men.  In  the  regular  army 
alone  our  losses  from  killed,  and  soldiers  who 
died  of  wounds,  were  1,466.  Add  to  this  the 
losses  of  volunteers  and  militia,  for  whom 
there  are  no  available  statistics.  No  well- 
informed  man  doubts  that  the  Seminoles 
killed  more  Americans  than  they  had  war- 
riors. The  British  had  massacred  us  just  as 
badly  in  our  assaults  upon  Canada,  which  we 
satisfactorily  explained  by  saying  that  the 
British  were  regulars.  Here  were  Indians 
doing  the  same  thing.  The  Florida  War,  about 
which  so  little  is  said,  became  our  bloodiest 
and  costliest  affair,  proportionately ;  yet  com- 
petent troops  could  have  ended  it  with  the 
first  battle.  Indian  resistance  would  have 
been  paralyzed  at  the  Withlacoochee,  if  the 
volunteers  and  militia  had  been  trained  men 
and  properly  handled.  The  raw  militia  called 
out  at  the  beginning  of  this  war  were  only 
supposed  to  serve  for  three  months.  I  am 
not  going  into  details  of  those  heart-breaking 
seven  years,  seven  years  of  wading  through 
[105] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

morasses — of  brave  men  fighting  with  the 
fevers  and  dying  like  flies.  A  single  regiment 
lost  217  men  from  disease.  Think  of  the  ter- 
rific death  rate.  Our  little  army,  whose  max- 
imum strength  was  4,191,  suffered  a  death 
rate  that  fell  only  411  men  short  of  the  total 
number  killed  in  the  War  of  1812 — in  which 
we  employed  more  than  half  a  million  men. 
All  of  which  could  have  been  avoided  by  ef- 
fective action  at  the  start. 

During  two  years  of  this  period,  1836-1838, 
we  were  also  engaged  in  the  Creek  War,  and 
the  Cherokee  War. 

The  total  troops  employed,  volunteers, 
militia  and  regulars  from  1835  to  1842 — 
which  included  the  Creek  War  and  the  Cher- 
okee War,  amounted  to  60,691 — all  of  these 
against  a  mere  handful  of  Indians.  What  do 
you  think  now  of  the  10  to  1  proposition ! 


[106] 


xvni 

A  LONESOME  GENERAL 

DURING  1838  and  1839  we  had  another  seri- 
ous complication  with  Great  Britain  along  the 
Niagara  frontier  which  seemed  to  foreshadow 
a  third  great  war.  There  were  armed  inva- 
sions of  British  territory  by  Americans;  an 
expedition  crossed  from  Canada  to  our  side, 
killed  several  persons,  set  the  steamer  Caro- 
line on  fire,  and  drifted  her  over  the  falls. 
200,000  Americans  banded  themselves  to- 
[107] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

gether  under  the  name  of  "Canadian  Patri- 
ots" with  the  avowed  object  of  invading  and 
annexing  Canada.  At  this  critical  juncture 
General  Scott  was  dispatched  to  the  frontier, 
with  full  authority  to  call  on  the  governors 
of  all  the  border  States,  including  Virginia 
and  Kentucky,  for  such  force  of  militia  as  he 
might  deem  expedient.  Here  we  were  again, 
blindly  trying  the  same  militia  experiment. 

In  addressing  excited  crowds  along  the  bor- 
der, General  Scott  was  obliged  to  inform  the 
people :  "I  stand  before  you  without  troops, 
and  without  arms,  save  the  sword  at  my 
side."  Which  would  make  a  wonderful  his- 
torical painting,  a  dramatic  and  spectacular 
opera  bouffe,  but  is  no  businesslike  method 
of  conducting  a  modern  campaign. 

We  patched  up  our  squabble  with  Great 
Britain  to  renew  it  next  year  in  a  dispute 
over  the  boundaries  of  the  State  of  Maine. 
There  is  no  guessing  when  the  most  peaceable 
chap  is  going  to  mix  up  in  a  scrap  with  neigh- 
bors. All  this  time  the  Florida  War  was 
likewise  dragging  along.  We  never  brought 
[108] 


A  Lonesome  General 


it  to  a  close  until  1842,  and,  after  seven  years 
of  fruitless  fighting,  had  to  give  the  Indians 
their  own  way  to  get  peace.  Didn't  know 
that,  did  you?  That's  torn  out  of  the  popu- 
lar histories. 

Here  is  what  we  should  have  learned  from 
these  Indian  wars: 

First.  That  the  expense  was  tripled,  if  not 
quadrupled,  by  that  feature  of  the  law  of 
1821  which  gave  the  Government,  in  times  of 
emergency,  no  discretion  to  increase  the  num- 
ber of  enlisted  men  in  the  army. 

Second.  That,  after  successfully  employ- 
ing militia  and  volunteers  for  short  periods 
of  service,  and  exhausting  their  enthusiasm, 
Congress  found  it  more  humane  and  economi- 
cal to  continue  operations  with  regular  troops 
enlisted  for  the  period  of  five  years. 

Third.  That  for  want  of  a  well-defined 
peace  organization,  a  nation  of  seventeen 
millions  of  people  contended  for  seven  years 
with  1,200  warriors,  and  finally  closed  the 
struggle  without  accomplishing  the  forcible 
[109] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

emigration  of  the  Indians — which  was  the 
original  and  sole  cause  of  the  war. 

These  were  the  lessons   which   Congress 
and  our  people  failed  to  learn. 


[110] 


XIX 
THE  MEXICAN  PAKADOX 

BEGINNING  in  1845,  the  Mexican  War  was 
a  series  of  unexampled  victories,  from  Palo 
Alto  to  Buena  Vista  on  the  North,  from  Vera 
Cruz  and  Cerro  Gordo  to  the  Mexican  Capi- 
tal on  the  South. 

Successes  so  brilliant  would  apparently  de- 
note the  perfection  of  military  policy,  yet 
paradoxical  as  it  may  seem,  they  were 
achieved  under  the  same  system  of  laws  and 
[111] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

Executive  Orders  which  in  the  preceding 
foreign  war  had  led  to  a  succession  of  calami- 
ties, terminating  in  the  capture  of  "Washing- 
ton City.  The  explanation  of  this  paradox 
is  found  in  the  different  character  of  our  ad- 
versaries, but  more  particularly  the  differ- 
ence in  the  quality  of  the  army  with  which  we 
began  the  two  wars. 

The  Mexican  War  broke  out  three  years 
after  the  Florida  War  ended,  when  we  had 
a  large  number  of  well-trained  men.  Com- 
paring it  with  the  War  of  1812  we  find  that 
in  the  War  of  1812  the  combined  force  of 
regulars,  and  volunteers  of  one  year  or 
more  of  service,  was  but  12  per  cent  of  the 
total  troops  employed,  while  88  per  cent  were 
raw  recruits.  In  the  Mexican  War  these  fig- 
ures were  exactly  reversed — 88  per  cent  of 
our  troops  were  either  regulars,  or  volun- 
teers who  had  seen  at  least  twelve  months' 
service.  In  the  one  war  an  army  of  5,401 
raw  troops  fighting  in  defense  of  our  Na- 
tional Capital,  fled  before  1,500  redcoats, 
with  a  loss  of  19  killed  and  wounded.  In  the 
[112] 


The  Mexican  Paradox 


other,  a  force  of  less  than  5,000  trained  vol- 
unteers, supported  by  a  few  regular  troops, 
overthrew  the  Mexican  army  of  four  times 
their  number. 

In  the  one  war  5,000  regulars  held  Canada, 
baffling  all  of  our  efforts  at  invasion;  in  the 
other  our  army  numbering  6,000  combatants 
triumphantly  entered  the  enemy's  Capital. 

There  is  still  another  reason,  growing  out 
of  the  foresight  of  George  Washington  in  es- 
tablishing the  military  academy  at  West 
Point.  General  Scott  himself  has  forcibly 
stated  this  reason,  "I  give  it  as  my  fixed 
opinion  that  but  for  our  graduated  cadets 
the  war  between  the  United  States  and  Mex- 
ico might,  and  probably  would,  have  lasted 
some  four  or  five  years,  with,  in  its  first  half, 
more  defeats  than  victories  falling  to  our 
share.  Whereas,  in  less  than  two  campaigns, 
we  conquered  a  great  country  and  a  peace 
without  the  loss  of  a  single  battle  or  skir- 
mish." 

That 's  fine !  That 's  the  way  I  want  my  sol- 
diers to  talk  and  fight.  But  we  had  our  worri- 
[113] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

merits  during  that  Mexican  War,  mostly 
growing  out  of  the  same  old  muddle  of  militia 
and  short-term  enlistments.  And,  also,  out 
of  the  military  innocence  cherished  by  our 
friends  the  statesmen  on  Capitol  Hill. 

In  order  to  avoid  any  possible  variation  in 
our  method  of  courting  calamity,  General 
Taylor,  who  commanded  on  the  Texas  border, 
was  instructed  to  resist  invasion,  and  if  ex- 
pedient to  carry  the  war  into  Mexico.  For 
this  purpose  he  was  empowered  to  call  upon 
the  militia  of  the  surrounding  states,  and  par- 
ticularly the  Texans. 

Here  we  go  again,  limping  off  on  the  same 
old  crippled  foot,  trying  to  do  again  the  very 
thing  which  caused  the  loss  of  an  army  at 
Queenstown,  where  our  militia  refused  to 
serve  outside  the  United  States.  Of  course, 
it  was  a  palpable  violation  of  the  Constitution 
to  send  militia  on  a  foreign  invasion.  Our 
regular  force  at  that  time,  on  paper,  was 
about  4,000  men.  By  actual  figures  this 
"army  of  occupation"  on  the  frontiers  of 
Texas,  in  May,  1846,  numbered  73  companies, 
[114] 


The  Mexican  Paradox 


with  209  officers  and  2,839  men  actually  pres- 
ent. Each  of  these  companies,  but  for  a  de- 
fect in  the  law,  should  have  mustered  100 
men ;  which  would  have  raised  the  total  force 
to  about  8,000. 

His  numerical  weakness,  however,  did  not 
bluff  General  Taylor.  "What  he  had  was  good. 
Four-fifths  of  his  officers  were  West  Pointers, 
trained  to  their  trade.  Six  months  in  a  camp 
of  instruction  at  Corpus  Christi  had  brought 
his  troops  to  the  highest  point  of  discipline 
and  esprit  de  corps. 

On  the  25th  of  April  Thornton 's  Dragoons, 
in  a  skirmish  on  the  east  bank  of  the  river 
lost  16  killed  and  11  wounded.  The  emer- 
gency had  arisen,  and  Taylor  promptly 
called  upon  the  Governors  of  Louisiana  and 
Texas  for  5,000  volunteers.  But  the  call 
came  too  late.  Volunteers  could  not  reach 
him. 

On  April  26th  the  enemy  crossed  the  Rio 

Grande  in  large  force,  and  next  day  Taylor 

accepted  their  challenge  at  Palo  Alto.    The 

fight  began  at  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon, 

[115] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

and  by  dark  the  Americans  were  masters  of 
the  field.  The  following  day  Taylor  routed 
the  Mexicans  at  Resaca  de  la  Palma  and 
drove  them  across  the  Eio  Grande.  Now, 
here's  the  point.  Instead  of  having  8,000 
men,  General  Taylor's  force  numbered  173 
officers  and  2,049  men,  of  whom  1,700  were 
engaged.  His  loss  was  10  per  cent — 170  killed 
and  wounded.  The  enemy's  force  was  estir 
mated  at  6,000  with  a  loss  of  1,000.  Keen- 
f  orcements  reached  the  Americans  three  days 
too  late  for  salvation,  if  General  Taylor  had 
been  overwhelmed. 

In  response  to  Taylor's  call  the  veteran 
General  Gaines  at  New  Orleans  promptly  set 
to  work  organizing  and  equipping  an  army 
on  his  own  responsibility.  So  rapidly  did  he 
proceed,  calling  on  the  Governors  of  Ala- 
bama, Mississippi  and  Missouri,  that  he  sent 
8,000  troops  to  General  Taylor  before  he 
could  be  relieved  of  command  and  stopped. 

And  thereby  hangs  another  distressing 
tale;  5,389  men  were  sent  from  Louisiana  to 
General  Taylor  after  the  emergency  had 
[116] 


The  Mexican  Paradox 


passed.  Destitute  of  equipment  and  trans- 
portation, they  were  compelled  to  fret  in  idle- 
ness until  discharged.  Called  out  for  three 
months  they  returned  home  without  the  sat- 
isfaction of  having  fired  a  shot.  Their  losses 
by  death  were  145 — just  25  less  than  were 
killed  and  wounded  in  the  battles  of  Palo 
Alto  and  Kesaca  de  la  Palma.  Casualties  of 
carelessness  nearly  equaled  those  of  bat- 
tle. "Which  is  a  mighty  good  reason  why  men 
should  hate  to  volunteer,  and  expose  them- 
selves to  a  futile  death. 

Now  think  of  this :  While  some  20,000  vol- 
unteers were  hastily  dispatched  to  the  the- 
ater of  war,  not  a  solitary  wagon  reached 
General  Taylor  until  after  his  capture  of 
Monterey.  The  fact  of  it  is,  there  was  neither 
gossip  nor  information  on  file  at  Washington 
as  to  whether  or  not  wagons  could  be  used  in 
Mexico.  We  had  no  Bureau  of  Military  Sta- 
tistics. When  Taylor  began  his  march  on 
Monterey  with  6,000  men,  for  lack  of  trans- 
portation and  subsistence  he  was  compelled 
to  leave  behind  him  6,000  other  men. 
[117] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

Providence  condones  the  blunders  of  these 
United  States,  and  this  wagon  oversight 
switched  round  to  our  advantage.  It  enabled 
General  Taylor  to  form  the  volunteers  who 
were  left  behind  into  an  army  of  the  second 
line,  to  drill  and  prepare  them  for  future 
campaigns.  Those  whom  he  carried  with 
him,  he  put  through  a  course  of  six  hours* 
drilling  per  day.  Never  was  the  value  of 
disciplined  men  more  triumphantly  demon- 
strated; 4,759  men,  of  whom  but  517  were 
regulars,  at  the  battle  of  Buena  Vista,  de- 
feated the  entire  Mexican  army  of  18,133  men, 
with  20  pieces  of  artillery.  General  Taylor, 
in  his  official  report,  comments  upon  the 
"high  state  of  discipline  and  instruction  of 
several  of  the  volunteer  regiments." 


[1181 


XX 

ADVANCE,  HALT,  AND  GENTLEMEN 
CHANGE 

DESPITE  these  dazzling  American  successes 
at  the  North  the  Mexicans  refused  to  sue  for 
peace,  so  General  Scott  was  ordered  to  cap- 
ture the  City  of  Mexico  itself — with  fewer 
than  12,000  men.  Vera  Cruz  surrendered  to 
him  on  the  29th  of  March,  1847.  On  the  8th 
of  April  he  began  his  march  into  the  interior. 
On  the  18th  at  Cerro  Gordo,  he  attacked  and 
overthrew  the  Mexican  army,  capturing  3,- 
[119] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

000  prisoners  and  43  pieces  of  artillery.  So 
complete  was  their  annihilation  that  Mexico 
no  longer  had  an  army  and  the  road  to  the 
Capital  lay  open.  But  the  American  gen- 
eral had  to  stop,  solely  and  simply  because  of 
an  error  committed  under  the  dome  of  our 
Capitol  at  Washington.  Here  he  was,  com- 
manding a  handful  of  men,  in  the  heart  of  a 
hostile  country,  with  troops  that  were  en- 
listed, not  "for  the  war,"  but  with  the  op- 
tion'"to  serve  twelve  months"  or  "to  the 
end  of  the  war."  " 

There  was  absolutely  no  excuse  for  this; 
it  could  have  been  prevented  if  a  solitary 
member  of  Congress,  familiar  with  the  mili- 
tary history  of  his  country,  had  moved  to 
strike  out  the  loophole  option.  But  there  it 
was,  left  in  the  law  by  the  ignorance  and  the 
haste  of  legislators.  National  enthusiasm 
would  have  supplied  men  for  the  war,  as 
bountifully  as  for  twelve  months.  The  term 
of  Scott's  twelve  months  men  was  about  to 
expire.  They  wanted  to  go  home,  and  had 
the  unquestioned  legal  right.  So  on  the  4th 
[120] 


Advance,  Halt,  and  Gentlemen  Change 

of  May,  almost  immediately  after  his  triumph 
at  Cerro  Gordo,  he  was  compelled  to  part 
with  seven  out  of  his  eleven  regiments  of  vol- 
unteers, numbering  in  the  aggregate  4,000 
men. 

Which  left  him  confronting  a  precarious 
situation :  Scott  was  now  at  Puebla,  within 
two  days'  march  of  Mexico  City,  his  army 
being  reduced  to  5,820  effective  men.  He 
must  sit  tight  and  if  possible  cling  to  what  he 
had  conquered,  while  the  enemy,  profiting  by 
our  numskullery  and  ftelay,  reorganized  an 
army  of  five  times  his  number.  Abandoning 
Jalapa,  cut  off  from  his  base  of  supplies, 
Scott's  marvelous  victories  were  about  to  go 
for  nothing,  and  his  campaign  seemed  on  the 
verge  of  collapse. 

Army  officers  to-day  insist  that  if  General 
Scott's  small  force  of  regulars  had  then  been 
captured,  100,000  recruits  and  inexperienced 
officers  would  not  have  been  sufficient  to  re- 
trieve the  disaster. 

Scott's  little  army  lay  at  Puebla  for  more 
than  two  months,  while  regiments  were  being 
[121] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

raised  in  the  United  States  to  take  the  places 
of  those  who  had  returned  home.  Three  and 
one-half  months  after  the  battle  of  Cerro 
Gordo  reinforcements  raised  his  total  to  10,- 
276  men,  of  whom  nearly  one-fourth  were 
sick.  On  August  6th  other  reinforcements 
brought  their  numbers  up  to  nearly  14,000, 
of  whom  3,000  were  sick  or  in  the  hospitals. 
Compelled  still  further  to  weaken  himself  by 
guarding  his  line  of  communications,  Scott 
resumed  the  offensive,  against  an  army  esti- 
mated by  the  Mexicans  themselves  at  36,000 
men,  with  100  pieces  of  cannon.  But  General 
Scott  had  exceeding  confidence  in  the  charac- 
ter of  his  troops  and  fearlessly  led  them  to 
a  succession  of  brilliant  victories.  Begin- 
ning on  the  20th  of  August  our  largest  force 
engaged  was  8,479  men,  of  whom  he  lost,  in 
the  series  of  battles,  2,703.  So  that  on  Sep- 
tember 14th,  he  entered  the  City  of  Mexico 
with  fewer  than  6,000  men. 

But — and  here  is  a  great  big  but, — but  for 
a  defect  in  legislation  at  Washington  we 
would  have  captured  the  City  of  Mexico  with- 
[122] 


Advance,  Halt,  and  Gentlemen  Change 

out  resistance,  directly  after  the  battle  of 
Cerro  Gordo,  saving  thousands  of  heroic  lives 
and  enormous  expenditures  of  money.  This 
particular  exhibition  of  inefficiency  is  wholly 
chargeable  to  Congress.  Yet,  even  now,  when 
an  army  officer  goes  before  that  body  and 
asks  for  essential  betterments,  he  may  be  met 
with  the  insinuation  of  selfish  lobbying  for 
personal  advancement. 

However,  we  won't  cry  over  spilt  milk. 
But  you  and  I,  and  the  folks  back  home,  must 
see  that  such  blunders  do  not  occur  in  the 
future. 


[123] 


OPENING  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

AT  the  beginning  of  the  War  of  1812,  as  you 
remember,  we  maintained  no  regular  army. 
We  started  from  the  bottom  and  built  new  to 
the  top.  Volunteers  and  militia  found  no 
grizzled  veterans  to  show  them  what  to  do, 
or  to  set  the  pace  for  obedience  and  efficiency. 
Throughout  the  Mexican  War  our  regulars 
not  only  bore  the  brunt  of  fighting,  and  sus- 
tained the  heaviest  losses,  but  they  furnished 
[124] 


Openvng  the  Civil  War 


able  commanders  to  the  militia  and  to  the 
volunteers,  holding  up  magnificent  examples 
of  skill,  fortitude  and  courage. 

After  the  Mexican  War  Congress  immedi- 
ately reduced  the  army  from  30,890  men  to 
10,320.  Here  we  have  the  same  old  policy  of 
dismissing  our  trained  soldiers  the  minute 
fighting  time  had  passed.  When  we  wanted 
them  again,  mighty  bad  and  mighty  quick,  we 
didn't  have  any.  Congress  has  always  fig- 
ured that  a  considerate  enemy  would  always 
permit  us  an  abundance  of  leisure  to  begin 
preparations  after  the  actual  fighting  has 
commenced — plenty  of  time  to  apply  for  in- 
surance after  the  house  catches  fire. 

Therefore,  at  the  close  of  1860,  with  a  pop- 
ulation of  31,000,000  and  3,000,000  square 
miles  of  territory,  we  were  practically  desti- 
tute of  military  force.  The  regular  army  in 
fact  numbered  16,367,  scattered  along  our  in- 
terminable frontiers,  stationed  at  isolated 
western  posts,  and  guarding  the  Atlantic 
Coast  from  Maine  to  Florida.  Imagine  try- 
[125] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

ing  to  cover  the  Sahara  Desert  with  a  dime's 
worth  of  butter. 

And,  considering  what  happened  during  the 
Civil  War  from  a  strictly  military  viewpoint, 
we  find  that  our  standards  of  comparison  are 
wholly  different  from  those  of  previous  wars, 
for  here  the  great  bulk  of  soldiers  on  both 
sides  were  raw  recruits  at  the  beginning.  On 
both  sides,  however,  they  got  such  a  hard 
and  continuous  service  as  to  weld  them  into 
iron  veterans,  equal  to  the  Old  Guard  of  Na- 
poleon. So  I  shall  merely  give  a  few  in- 
stances to  prove  that  the  same  faults  and  in- 
efficiencies observable  from  Eevolutionary 
times  had  not  disappeared. 

On  March  26,  1861,  the  Confederate  Presi- 
dent called  for  100,000  men  to  take  the  field 
for  the  period  of  one  year  under  his  unques- 
tioned and  supreme  command.  The  few 
United  States  regulars  were  scattered  from 
the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific,  too  far  away  to 
participate  in  the  first  shock  of  arms.  Presi- 
dent Lincoln,  of  course,  called  for  militia, 
President  and  Cabinet  showing  a  fatuous  con- 
[126] 


Opening  the  Civil  War 


fidence  in  raw  troops,  wholly  unshaken  by 
all  their  feeble  tragedies.  There  was  noth- 
ing else  to  do.  Eegulars  simply  did  not  ex- 
ist. 

The  first  Federal  call  was  for  75,000  militia 
to  serve  a  period  of  three  months.  In  the 
light  of  history  it  is  almost  incredible  that 
the  Federal  Government  should  attempt  the 
reconquest  of  560,000  miles  of  Southern  ter- 
ritory, with  raw  recruits,  and  in  the  brief 
space  of  three  months.  The  South,  as  I  am 
reliably  informed,  likewise  did  a  little  sup- 
posing, that  one  Southerner  could  lick  ten 
Yankees,  and  the  war  would  be  a  brief  and 
happy  picnic. 

Here's  an  example:  The  District  of  Co- 
lumbia was  called  upon  to  supply  ten  com- 
panies. All  but  three  of  these  companies 
mustered  into  the  service  for  three  months, 
with  the  stipulation  to  serve  within  the  Dis- 
trict, and  not  to  go  out  of  it.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  many  of  these  men  afterwards  served 
outside  of  the  District  without  protest;  I 
mention  the  incident  merely  to  prove  the  rule, 
[127] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

that  it  is  only  raw  troops  who  presume  to  dic- 
tate to  their  lawful  commanders. 

In  the  North  volunteers  rushed  to  arms  in 
numbers  far  exceeding  the  needs  of  the  gov- 
ernment. 

Both  the  Union  and  Confederacy  repeated 
the  plunder  of  short  enlistments.  Confeder- 
ate troops  began  pouring  into  Virginia  and 
moving  towards  the  Potomac.  Washington 
City  was  practically  in  a  state  of  siege.  Ow- 
ing to  the  weakness  of  the  Federal  military 
system,  President  Lincoln  made  of  himself  a 
virtual  dictator,  and  assumed  to  exercise  the 
war  powers  of  Congress.  By  proclamation 
on  the  3rd  of  May  he  increased  the  land  and 
naval  forces  by  more  than  80,000  men. 

My  son,  folks  in  this  country  do  a  lot 
of  gossiping  about  military  dictatorships 
which  might  result  from  a  competent  stand- 
ing army.  Dictatorships  do  not  come  that 
way,  Twice  in  similar  circumstances,  when 
Congress  has  been  too  feeble  or  negligent 
to  provide  a  competent  national  defense,  dic- 
tatorial powers  were  conferred  upon  George 
[128] 


Opening  the  Civil  War 


Washington ;  and  now  Lincoln  assumed  them 
himself.  Thus  we  see  a  President  who  had 
sworn  to  defend  and  protect  the  Constitution, 
knowingly  overriding  the  law  to  save  the 
Union. 

When  Congress  assembled  in  extra  session 
on  July  4,  1861,  it  found  that  its  power  to 
"raise  and  support  armies"  had  already 
been  exercised  by  the  President  to  the  extent 
of  230,000  men,  an  usurpation  which  met  with 
the  approval  of  Congress  and  the  people. 


[129] 


xxn 

WHAT  OF  THE  KEGULAES? 

AT  the  outset  there  was  considerable  dis- 
cussion as  to  what  should  be  done  with  the 
regular  army,  whether  it  were  not  wise  to 
abolish  it  altogether,  and  assign  the  trained 
officers  to  such  duties  with  volunteer  regi- 
ments as  their  talents  fitted  them  to  dis- 
charge. But  as  the  volunteers  themselves 
began  to  get  a  smattering  of  kindergarten 
tactics,  when  they  learned  to  distinguish 
[130] 


What  of  the  Regulars® 


which  end  of  a  musket  should  properly  be 
held  to  the  shoulder,  they  concluded  that  they 
could  get  along  without  West  Point  dudes  to 
chaperon  their  martial  activities. 

As  a  curious  bit  of  history :  In  1861  a  cer- 
tain U.  S.  Grant  volunteered  the  service  of 
his  military  education,  but  no  notice  was  ever 
taken  of  it.  His  letter  was  not  thought  of 
sufficient  importance  to  be  preserved. 

Five  weeks  later,  placed  at  the  head  of  a 
regiment  by  Governor  Yates  of  Illinois,  he 
began  the  career  which  led  to  supreme  com- 
mand of  the  Union  army  and  to  the  Presi- 
dency. 

At  this  time  there  were  741  graduates  of 
the  Military  Academy.  168  Southern  officers 
resigned  and  went  to  their  home  states,  while 
92  ex-graduates,  who  had  gone  out  of  the 
service  in  1861,  also  joined  the  Confeder- 
acy, providing  the  Southern  army  with  260 
trained  officers. 

Five  hundred  and  fifty-six  West  Pointers 
remained  with  the  Union,  while  102  ex-gradu- 
ates reentered  service,  thus  giving  the  Fed- 
[131] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  tine  United,  States 

era!  Government  658  educated  soldiers  to  di- 
rect its  campaigns. 

Singularly  enough  the  operations  imme- 
diately prior  to  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Kun 
presented  the  same  difficulties  as  those  which 
destroyed  the  ill-starred  Montgomery  at  his 
assault  upon  Quebec — the  Union  command- 
er's plans  were  disarranged  by  the  impending 
dissolution  of  his  army  because  of  short-term 
enlistments.  On  June  16th,  Gen.  Patterson, 
commanding  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah, 
advanced  within  ten  miles  of  Winchester,  Va., 
then  occupied  by  the  Confederates.  From 
that  point  he  wrote:  "I  have  to  report  that 
the  term  of  service  of  a  very  large  portion  of 
this  force  will  expire  in  a  few  days.  From 
the  undercurrent  of  feeling  I  am  confident 
that  many  will  be  inclined  to  lay  down  their 
arms  on  the  day  their  time  expires.  Active 
operations  towards  Winchester  cannot  be 
thought  of  until  they  are  replaced  by  three- 
year  men." 

A  few  days  later,  having  transferred  his 
forces  to  Charlestown,  near  Harpers  Ferry, 
[1321 


What  of  the  Regulars? 


Patterson  telegraphed  the  Adjutant  General : 
"With  the  existing  feeling  and  determina- 
tion of  the  three-months  men  to  return  home, 
it  would  be  ruinous  to  advance  or  even  to  stay 
here." 

The  three-months  volunteers  expressed 
determination  not  to  serve  one  hour  after 
their  time  expired.  General  Patterson  began 
a  movement  to  the  front,  and  was  assailed 
with  earnest  remonstrances  against  being  de- 
tained beyond  their  terms  of  service.  Even 
if  he  should  capture  Winchester  he  would  be 
without  men,  and  compelled  to  retreat.  He 
appealed  to  the  regiments  to  stand  by  their 
country  for  a  week  or  ten  days.  History  was 
repeating  itself,  as  Col.  Biddle  subsequently 
testified.  General  Patterson  had  seen  pre- 
cisely the  same  thing  happen  to  General  Scott 
at  Puebla,  Mexico.  After  making  fruitless 
appeals  to  his  men,  one-half  to  two-thirds  of 
them  refused  to  remain.  Three  days  after- 
wards, July  21,  1861,  on  the  morning  of  the 
battle  of  Bull  Eun,  while  the  Secretary  of 
War  and  the  commanding  General  vainly  im- 
[133] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

plored  them,  a  regiment  of  infantry  and  a 
battery  of  artillery  whose  time  had  expired 
began  their  homeward  march  to  the  sound  of 
the  enemy's  guns.  That  same  day  the  Fed- 
eral army  was  totally  defeated. 

Standing  like  a  guide  post  above  the  rout, 
discipline  and  organization  again  proved 
their  value.  The  battalion  of  regulars  which 
covered  the  retreat  was  last  to  leave  the  field, 
checked  the  enemy's  pursuit,  and  retired  in 
perfect  order.  According  to  official  reports, 
all  of  the  Federal  troops,  except  800,  were 
volunteers  and  militia,  Some  of  the  volun- 
teers had  been  mustered  into  the  service  less 
than  a  month.  The  time  of  service  of  all  the 
regiments  of  militia  was  about  to  expire. 
Any  educated  officers,  knowing  these  condi- 
tions, must  have  seen  the  inevitable  defeat 
which  occurred  at  Bull  Run. 

There  was  no  such  thing  as  discipline. 
General  Heintzleman,  after  passionate  fail- 
ures to  rally  his  broken  regiments,  expressed 
himself  as  to  their  conduct:  "The  want  of 
discipline  in  these  regiments  was  so  great 
[134] 


What  of  the  Regulars? 


that  most  of  the  men  would  run  from  fifty  to 
several  hundred  yards  to  the  rear  and  con- 
tinue to  fire, — fortunately  for  the  braver  ones 
— very  high  in  the  air. ' ' 

The  Confederate  forces  were  estimated  at 
29,949,  and  the  Federals  at  28,568. 

Military  men  now  say,  quite  impartially, 
that  a  well  trained  army,  half  the  size  of 
either,  could  probably  have  beaten  them  both 
combined. 


[135] 


xxm 

THE  CONFEDERACY  FIRST  SEES  THE 
LIGHT 

VOLTJNTEEKS  will  never  provide  a  certain 
and  dependable  supply  of  man-power  to  main- 
tain a  long  war.  It 's  like  this :  On  the  first 
chill  day  of  winter  you  start  your  furnace  to 
warm  the  house.  It  won't  do  just  to  light  a 
fire,  throw  on  some  coal,  slam  the  furnace 
door  and  let  her  heat  up.  That  might  be  all 
sufficient  if  the  cold  spell  only  lasted  a  couple 
of  hours.  But  the  winter  runs  on,  and  bliz- 
[136] 


The  Confederacy  First  Sees  the  Light 

zards  get  worse.  To  keep  that  furnace  going 
full  blast  you  must  have  plenty  more  coal, 
right  handy  in  your  cellar.  No  man  is  fool 
enough  to  light  one  fire,  then  sit  down  and 
depend  upon  voluntary  contributions  of  coal 
that  the  neighbors  may  send  in.  Not  much ! 
Your  full  supply  must  be  steady,  reliable,  con- 
venient— where  it  may  be  shoveled  into  the 
proper  place  at  the  proper  time. 

It's  exactly  like  that  with  an  army  during 
a  protracted  war — you  must  know  where  the 
supply  of  man-power  is  coming  from.  Vol- 
unteers will  never  maintain  a  uniform  supply 
of  the  numbers  needed  and,  above  all,  when 
needed. 

At  the  opening  of  the  Civil  War,  both  the 
Union  and  Confederate  governments  pursued 
the  same  temporizing  and  uncertain  policy 
of  relying  upon  voluntary  enlistments  for 
short  terms.  After  the  Confederate  defeat 
at  Fort  Donelson,  the  evacuation  of  Kentucky 
and  Tennessee,  and  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  the 
Confederate  Congress  first  displayed  to  the 
world  the  full  meaning  and  extent  of  the  pow- 
[137] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

er  to  "raise  and  support  armies."  By  act  of 
April  16, 1862,  the  Confederate  States  totally 
abandoned  the  principle  of  voluntary  enlist- 
ment, authorizing  President  Davis  to  call  out 
and  place  in  the  military  service  all  white  men 
between  the  ages  of  18  and  35.  The  draft  had 
already  been  adopted  by  the  State  of  Virginia 
in  February,  1862,  with  the  effect  of  immedi- 
ately adding  nearly  30,000  men  to  the  Vir- 
ginia contingent.  Conscripts  were  fitted  into 
old  organizations,  and  three  months'  drilling 
made  them  effective. 

This  Confederate  Act  of  1862,  was,  appar- 
ently, the  first  declaration  on  this  continent 
of  equal  and  universal  military  service.  One 
year  later  the  Federal  Congress  was  forced 
into  the  same  policy  by  declaring  every  man 
between  18  and  35  to  be  a  soldier.  Every  well- 
informed  American  knows  the  result  of  this 
legislation,  North  and  South.  It  filled  the 
army,  and  kept  men  continuously  in  the  field, 
until  long  service  and  habits  of  steady  obedi- 
ence transformed  raw  and  rabbit-legged  re- 
cruits into  veterans,  as  capable  and  efficient 
[138] 


The  Confederacy  First  Sees  the  Light 

as  ever  shouldered  a  musket.  The  same  faint- 
hearted individuals  who  fled  from  the  first 
battle  of  Bull  Eun,  afterwards  became  the 
sturdiest  troops  who  were  finally  victorious 
at  Appomattox. 

In  passing  let  us  note  a  singular  and  sig- 
nificant state  of  affairs.  The  South  stood 
largely  upon  the  doctrine  of  States  Eights, 
which  the  North  repudiated.  Yet  during  the 
second  period  of  the  war,  the  Union  fought 
as  a  co-partnership  of  States,  while  the  Con- 
federacy fought  as  a  nation.  The  Union  ap- 
pealed to  the  States,  adhered  to  voluntary 
enlistments,  and  left  the  Governors  with 
power  to  appoint  commissioned  officers.  The 
Confederacy  appealed  directly  to  the  people, 
President  Davis  appointed  the  officers,  they 
abandoned  voluntary  enlistment,  and  first 
adopted  the  republican  principle  that  every 
citizen  owes  his  country  military  service. 

To  illustrate  the  extravagant  use  of  men 
under  this  haphazard  volunteer  system,  and 
as  a  fact  interesting  in  itself,  it  may  be  men- 
tioned that  in  1861  the  total  force  of  the 
[139] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

Federal  Government  exceeded  the  total  field 
army  of  Germany  by  nearly  120,000  men.  Our 
infantry  of  volunteer  forces  exceeded  the 
Eussian  field  army  on  a  war  footing  by  237 
battalions.  Our  cavalry,  which  was  practi- 
cally useless  until  1863,  exceeded  the  total 
cavalry  of  the  Eussian  regular  army  by  965 
squadrons.  Of  course  we  saved  money  in 
times  of  peace,  but  in  war  times  we  spent  by 
billions,  when  it  was  too  late,  and  got  nothing 
for  it. 


[140] 


XXIV 
DEMAGOGUES  AND  DISSENSION 

1862  was  a  period  of  confusion  and  turmoil. 
Cabals,  intrigues  and  wirepulling  permeated 
every  department  at  Washington,  spreading 
dissension,  insubordination  and  distrust 
amongst  the  army.  Efforts  of  commanding 
officers  were  neutralized  and  change  followed 
change.  As  an  instance :  General  Burnside, 
when  at  the  head  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
resolved  to  suppress  insubordination,  and 
[141] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

had  actually  written  out  General  Orders  No. 
8,  dismissing  from  the  service  Generals  Hook- 
er, Brooks,  Cochrane  and  Newton.  Instead, 
however,  of  publishing  these  orders  Burn- 
side  went  to  Washington  to  confer  with  the 
President.  As  an  outcome  of  their  inter- 
view Lincoln  relieved  Burnside  of  command, 
and  appointed  Hooker,  in  this  characteristic 
letter: 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION, 

Washington,  D.  0., 

January  26, 1863. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  HOOKER: 
General: 

I  have  placed  you  at  the  head  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  Of  course  I  have  done  this 
upon  what  appears  to  me  to  be  sufficient  rea- 
son, and  yet  I  think  it  best  for  you  to  know 
that  there  are  some  things  with  regard  to 
which  I  am  not  satisfied  with  you.  I  believe 
you  to  be  a  brave  and  skillful  soldier,  which 
of  course  I  like.  I  also  believe  you  do  not 
mix  politics  with  your  profession,  in  which 
you  are  right.  You  have  confidence  in  your- 
[142] 


Demagogues  and  Dissension 

self,  which  is  a  valuable  if  not  an  indispensa- 
ble quality.  You  are  ambitious,  which,  within 
reasonable  bounds,  does  good  rather  than 
harm ;  but  I  think  that  during  General  Burn- 
side 's  command  of  the  army  you  have  taken 
counsel  of  your  ambition  and  thwarted  him 
as  much  as  you  could,  in  which  you  did  a 
great  wrong  to  the  country  and  to  a  most 
meritorious  and  honorable  brother  officer.  I 
have  heard  in  such  a  way  as  to  believe  it,  of 
your  recent  saying,  that  both  the  army  and 
the  Government  needed  a  dictator.  Of  course 
it  was  not  for  this,  but  in  spite  of  it,  that  I 
have  given  you  the  command.  Only  those 
generals  who  gain  success  can  set  up  dicta- 
tors. What  I  now  ask  of  you  is  military  suc- 
cess, and  I  will  risk  the  dictatorship.  The 
Government  will  support  you  to  the  utmost  of 
its  ability,  which  is  neither  more  or  less  than 
it  will  do  for  all  commanders.  I  much  fear 
the  spirit  which  you  have  aided  to  infuse  into 
the  army,  of  criticizing  their  commander  and 
withholding  confidence  from  him,  will  now 
turn  upon  you.  I  shall  assist  you  so  far  as  I 
[143] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

can  to  put  it  down.  Neither  you,  nor  Na- 
poleon, if  he  were  alive  again,  could  get  any 
good  out  of  an  army  while  such  a  spirit  pre- 
vails in  it.  And  now  beware  of  rashness.  Be- 
ware of  rashness,  but  with  energy  and  sleep- 
less vigilance  go  forward  and  give  us  vic- 
tories. 

Yours  very  truly, 

A.  LINCOLN. 

Politics  and  demagoguery  contributed  their 
sinister  influence  to  weaken  the  forces  in  the 
field.  It  grew  and  blossomed  and  bore  evil 
fruit.  Various  states  assumed  the  care  of 
their  own  sick  and  wounded  by  sending  agents 
to  the  front  and  bringing  home  the  soldiers, 
causing  hundreds  of  deaths,  against  the  ad- 
vice and  over  the  protest  of  military  sur- 
geons. Thousands  of  men  who  were  slightly 
ill,  and  thousands  of  malingerers,  were  pro- 
vided an  easy  means  to  get  entirely  out  of  the 
service.  Had  they  remained  at  the  front,  in 
care  of  regimental  surgeons,  most  of  them 
would  have  been  returned  to  duty  in  a  few 
days. 

[144] 


Demagogues  and  Dissension 

Politicians,  anxious  to  curry  favor  and 
make  votes,  withdrew  soldiers  from  the 
breastworks  to  be  used  at  the  polls. 

Once  safely  at  home,  if  a  man  wanted  to 
stay  there,  he  could  secure  a  discharge  by 
getting  any  physician  ''in  good  standing"  to 
sign  a  certificate  of  disability.  And  these  cer- 
tificates soon  acquired  a  commercial  value — 
as  was  inevitable  under  the  temptation.  Mi- 
litiamen learned  the  art  of  feigning  every  dis- 
ease suggested  by  patent  medicine  advertise- 
ments. Impositions  became  so  frequent  that 
discharges  for  rheumatics  were  absolutely 
barred — that  was  too  easy.  Records  of  the 
War  Department  show  that  disability  certifi- 
cates were  subjects  of  barter  and  sale.  Medi- 
cal officers  of  character  and  patriotism  were 
exposed  to  every  kind  of  bribery.  Thousands 
and  thousands  of  men  never  returned  to  the 
ranks.  General  McClellan  mentioned  a  single 
regiment,  which  sent  506  men  to  the  rear,  of 
whom  only  15  or  20  reported  again  for  duty. 
By  reason  of  "chronic  absenteeism"  and  de- 
[145] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

sertion,  the  Federal  army  at  Antietam  had 
101,756  absentees,  with  87,164  present. 

Out  of  a  certain  army  corps  13,000  were  in 
ranks,  while  15,000  were  absent.  Not  more 
than  one-tenth  of  the  sick  who  were  left  be- 
hind ever  rejoined  their  regiments. 

My  son,  listen  to  your  Uncle  Samuel,  and 
get  this  straight.  I  am  not  trying  to  hurt 
anybody's  feelings,  but  merely  showing  you 
how  a  bad  system  can  destroy  the  usefulness 
of  good  men.  Much  of  this  was  caused  by  a 
state  hospital  system,  which  grew  out  of  poli- 
tics, and  politics  won't  mix  with  soldiering. 


[146] 


XXV 

TO  OUR  MISTAUGHT  MILLIONS 

Now,  let's  put  the  Civil  "War  behind  us — 
except  for  its  lesson.  We've  got  a  mighty 
uncivil  war  ahead  of  us  which  demands  atten- 
tion. 

I  want  all  the  mistaught  and  misled  mil- 
lions of  this  nation  to  know  at  least  part  of 
the  reasons  why  we  chucked  that  old  volun- 
teer system  into  the  junk  heap.  Every 
mother  and  father  in  this  country,  when  their 
[147] 


The  Unpopulalr  History  of  the  United  States 

son  goes  off  to  war,  has  got  a  right  to  know. 
I  believe  in  explaining  things.  Folks  might 
think  that  we  are  sending  their  boys  across 
the  ocean  to  fight  some  other  fellow's  war. 
That's  not  so.  This  is  our  war.  It  was  our 
war  from  the  very  beginning,  but  we  didn't 
see  it,  not  then. 

Five  hundred  years  ago  the  English  people 
bluffed  and  bulldozed  their  Magna  Charta  out 
of  King  John,  which  laid  the  foundation  of 
British  liberty,  and  the  foundation  of  Ameri- 
can responsibility  in  the  present  struggle. 
Five  hundred  years  is  a  long  distance  to 
travel  backwards.  It's  true,  just  the  same. 
But  a  great  Big  Idea  started  then,  and  has 
been  traveling  forward  ever  since.  After- 
wards the  English  secured  the  Habeas  Corpus 
Act,  the  Bill  of  Eights,  and  other  guarantees 
of  personal  liberty.  We  brought  those  same 
rights  with  us  to  America,  and  we  think  a 
heap  of  'em.  They're  what  built  our  govern- 
ment. I've  been  finding  some  faults  with  our 
Government — but  you  can  bet  your  bottom 
dollar  I  love  it.  Pretty  soon  that  Big  Idea 
[148] 


To  Our  MistaugJit  Millions 


spread  over  the  entire  western  hemisphere, 
and  became  firmly  imbedded  in  most  of  the 
older  countries.  It  means  that  every  fellow 
must  have  an  equal  show — a  fair  shake,  a 
square  deal,  a  chance  for  his  white  alley.  Do 
I  put  it  plain?  We  Americans  are  powerful 
sot  in  our  notion  of  sticking  to  that  Big  Idea. 
We  won't  give  it  up,  not  without  a  fight. 

About  the  time  our  forefathers  were  sign- 
ing the  Declaration  of  Independence,  and  de- 
fending it,  Frederick  the  Great,  of  Prussia, 
was  lifting  his  obscure  kingdom  to  the  posi- 
tion of  a  world  power,  based  upon  a  totally 
different  idea,  the  Divine  Eight  of  Kings,  the 
right  of  a  solitary  man  to  rule  other  men 
whether  they  want  him  to  or  not.  Sometimes 
it  was  more  fun  for  Frederick  when  they 
didn  't  want  him.  The  Divine  Right  of  Kings 
likes  to  boss  the  plain  folks,  keep  'em  down, 
beat  'em  down — and  then  make  'em  love  it. 

Frederick  built,  Bismarck  perfected,  and 

the  present  Emperor  William  II   said   at 

Frankfort  that  his  "grandfather  had  by  his 

own  right  placed  upon  his  head  the  crown  of 

[149] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

the  kings  of  Prussia,"  and  that  he  was  re- 
sponsible to  no  man,  to  no  legislative  body,  to 
no  gathering  of  the  people,  and  he  didn't 
care  a  rap  whether  folks  liked  it  or  not.  That 
was  his  way  of  doing,  and  he  had  the  army 
behind  him. 

That 's  all  right,  if  a  man  gets  away  with  it, 
and  holds  his  job ;  he  will  build  the  strongest 
possible  government,  for  a  despot  centers  in 
his  own  hand  all  the  legislative  and  execu- 
tive powers.  At  his  nod  war  is  declared,  the 
army  is  launched,  and  the  cannons  roar.  It 
is  a  marvelously,  terribly,  brutally  efficient 
scheme  of  running  a  government.  It  can  do 
things — do  them  right  now. 

We  Americans  are  mighty  proud  of  the  fact 
that  our  Declaration  of  Independence,  and 
our  Constitution  have  become  a  pattern  for 
nearly  all  the  world — all  that  part  of  the 
world  which  is  not  controlled  by  the  Prussian 
Idea.  New  republics,  springing  up  in  every 
quarter  of  the  globe,  have  followed  our  lead. 
We  stand  for  that  Big  Idea,  and  we  have  to 
[150] 


To  Our  Mistaught  Millions 


stand  loy  it — that  common  folks  have  some 
rights,  which  even  emperors  must  respect. 

* '  My  will  is  the  supreme  law ! "  so  proclaim- 
eth  the  German  Kaiser. 

"All  power  is  derived  from  the  people!'* 
which  the  republics  of  this  earth  are  pledged 
to  maintain — or  they  die.  Don't  you  see  that 
the  Prussian  Idea  and  the  American  Idea  can 
never  march  down  the  big  road  together,  side 
by  side,  and  at  peace  I  Both  of  us  are  now  in 
the  big  road.  One  or  the  other  has  to  get  out. 
That's  all  there  is  about  it. 

Once  upon  a  time  old  Abe  Lincoln  said: 
* '  This  nation  cannot  endure  half-slave,  half- 
free" — nor  can  the  world.  Some  folks  say 
we  ought  to  stand  aside  and  let  Europe  fight 
it  out.  Stand  aside?  Where?  There's  no 
place  for  us  to  stand  without  stepping  off  the 
earth. 

Before  we  are  done  with  it,  I  look  for  a 
grand  alliance,  a  brotherhood  of  all  the  re- 
publics of  the  world,  marching  magnificently, 
shoulder  to  shoulder,  with  clear  eye  and 
[151] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

steady  tread,  moving  forward,  forward,  for- 
ward, to  the  final  triumph  of  mankind. 

Did  you  ever  hear  this  piece  of  poetry  by 
a  country  editor  in  Mississippi? 

' '  Onward,  upward,  press  the  peoples 
To  that  pure,  exalted  plane, 

Where  no  throne  shall  cast  a  shadow 
And  no  slave  shall  wear  a  chain. 

"They  are  lighting  fires  of  freedom 

On  a  million  altar  stones, 
"With  the  torches  they  have  kindled 

At  the  blaze  of  burning  thrones." 

We  couldn't  keep  our  hands  off  this  war. 
This  war  would  not  keep  hands  off  us.  I'm 
perfectly  willing  to  hoe  my  own  row,  and  let 
the  other  fellow  hoe  his.  But  Divine  Eight 
wants  to  cultivate  the  whole  field,  and  makes 
no  bones  about  it.  I'm  nothing  but  a  hard- 
headed,  striped-pants  Yankee,  but  some  facts 
are  so  plain  that  you  can't  shut  your  eyes  to 
'em.  If  we  sit  down,  with  both  hands  in  our 
pockets,  and  let  Divine  Bight  organize  all  Eu- 
[152] 


To  Our  Mistaught  Millions 


rope,  'twon  't  be  long  before  Europe  gets  too 
small  for  their  Welt  Politik  or  World  Kultur 
— whatever  they  call  it.  They  say  it's  better 
for  us — like  Belgium — to  have  Divine  Right 
straddling  our  necks — then  we  can  tote  a  heap 
bigger  skillet-load  of  Efficiency.  Of  course,  it 
cuts  no  ice  with  Divine  Eight,  whether  that 
suits  us  or  not. 

So,  you  see,  the  Prussian  military  idea  must 
be  destroyed  by  democracy,  or  it  will  destroy 
all  democracy.  Now,  as  we've  got  to  fight, 
we'd  better  go  in  strong  while  we  have  allies, 
rather  than  wait  and  fight  it  out  alone. 
Doesn't  that  sound  to  you  like  hoss  sense? 

And,  mind  you,  I  say  this  in  the  most  pro- 
found conviction,  we  are  bound  to  win  that 
war  on  the  soil  of  Europe,  or  we  may  expect 
to  lose  it  on  the  soil  of  America.  There's  no 
way  of  sidestepping.  We've  got  to  roll  up 
our  sleeves  and  make  the  world  so  free  that  a 
couple  of  emperors  can't  whisper  to  each 
other  and  touch  the  button  for  a  war  that  has 
already  slaughtered  forty-five  millions  of  hu- 
[153] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

man  beings — folks  like  you  and  me  and  wives 
and  babies. 

We  are  too  deep  in  this  war,  and  are  going 
to  make  a  business  of  it.  It  takes  soldiers  to 
fight  battles,  preachers  to  preach  sermons, 
and  jawsmiths  to  wrangle  before  justices  of 
the  peace. 

We  Ve  got  to  turn  out  soldiers.  I  want  my 
boy  in  khaki  to  be  just  a  little  better  than  any 
boy  that  our  allies  can  send — better  trained, 
better  equipped,  a  better  shot  and  better  paid. 
I  can't  bear  the  idea  of  sending  a  single  brave 
lad  over  there  into  a  deadly  peril  that  he 
knows  nothing  about.  That's  rank  murder, 
as  old  Light  Horse  Harry  said. 

I  have  been  trying  to  make  you  understand 
the  difference  between  soldiers  and  raw  re- 
cruits. A  raw  recruit  is  of  no  more  use  in  the 
trenches  of  France  than  a  left-handed  black- 
smith in  a  watchmaker's  shop — strong  and 
willing,  but  liable  to  smash  things. 


[154] 


XXVI 
THE  WORK  OF  WARSMITHS 

THOUSANDS  of  years  ago  every  able-bodied 
man  was  naturally  a  soldier;  now  he  is  not, 
not  by  a  jugful.  When  primeval  men  con- 
tended amongst  themselves,  they  used  the 
same  weapons  with  which  they  fought  the 
beasts — the  stone  ax,  and  the  club,  which 
fitted  easily  to  their  hands.  In  their  tribal 
conflicts  any  group  of  men,  however  hastily 
assembled,  constituted  an  army,  employing 
[155] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

the  same  simple  weapons  and  requiring  no 
discipline  or  tactics.  Through  the  evolution- 
ary processes  of  time,  special  weapons  were 
devised  by  men  for  use  against  men.  As  these 
implements  became  more  and  more  elaborate, 
they  necessitated  a  greater  and  greater  edu- 
cation in  their  use.  War  has  now  evolved 
into  a  science,  most  complex,  many-sided,  and 
embracing  practically  all  the  other  sciences. 
As  instruments  of  warfare  become  more  and 
more  intricate,  volunteer  forces  become  less 
and  less  efficient. 

In  this  complicated  and  highly  specialized 
modern  warfare,  it  requires  a  regular  army 
of  seasoned  and  disciplined  troops  to  defend 
our  country.  In  the  tribal  ages  there  were 
no  standing  armies  and  no  peace ;  every  male 
was  a  soldier,  to  be  called  upon  at  any  mo- 
ment, waiting  with  weapons  ready.  The  en- 
tire nation  stood  always  in  martial  array. 
When  gunpowder  was  invented,  war  was  be- 
coming a  profession,  and  men  must  be  espe- 
cially educated  for  it.  A  small  fraction  of 
the  male  population  was  then  set  aside  for 
[156] 


The  Work  of  Warsmiths 


soldiers,  leaving  merchants,  artisans  and 
fanners  to  pursue  the  arts  of  peace.  Com- 
merce flourished,  universities  sprang  up,  and 
civilization  throbbed  at  the  pulses  of  the 
world. 

To-day,  with  the  submarine,  the  aeroplane, 
huge  cannon,  abstruse  mathematical  calcula- 
tions of  range,  electrical  appliances,  scientific 
explosives — the  thousand  and  one  inventions 
now  adapted  to  the  trade  of  war — to-day  it  is 
quite  inconceivable  for  a  raw  recruit  to  be  of 
the  slightest  service.  We  must  have  men  who 
know  exactly  what  they  are  doing,  else  our 
republic  passes  into  ancient  history  with  the 
graves  of  Greece  and  the  ruins  of  fallen 
Borne. 

Yet,  in  spite  of  this,  some  residue  of  preju- 
dice yet  remains  against  a  powerful  standing 
army,  it  being  feared  as  a  tool  that  might  be 
used  by  selfish  ambition.  In  the  old  coun- 
tries standing  armies  originally  flaunted  the 
banners  of  great  feudal  houses — Bourbon, 
Hohenzollern,  Romanoff,  Hapsburg.  But  the 
free  soldiers  of  a  Republic,  fathers,  brothers, 
[157] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

sons  of  the  people,  created  by  the  people  and 
responsible  to  the  people — such  an  army  in 
a  pure  democracy  must  prove  the  bulwark, 
the  safeguard,  and  not  a  menace  to  the  state. 
All  these  considerations,  and  a  blamed 
sight  more,  kept  buzzing  around  in  my  head, 
and  absolutely  convinced  me  that  our  old 
come-and-go-as-you-please  volunteer  militia 
wouldn't  do.  The  shamefullest  crime  is 
against  the  boys  themselves — putting  them 
up  to  be  shot  down  without  a  chance.  Sup- 
pose you  run  over  some  day  and  see  those 
youngsters  drilling  at  Fort  Myer.  The  eter- 
nal sunshine  never  lighted  up  a  finer  lot  of 
faces,  frank  of  soul,  clean  of  heart  and  stout 
of  limb.  You  can't  chuck  a  brick  bat  in  that 
crowd  anywhere  and  hit  a  boy  that  you 
wouldn't  trust.  They  are  good  boys,  they  are 
my  boys,  and  by  the  grace  o'  God  I'm  going 
to  give  'em  a  chance.  If  I  do  my  part,  they'll 
do  the  rest.  And  the  best  way  to  fix  that  is 
by  the  Selective  Draft — we've  got  it  on  the 
statute  books  right  now.  But  we  also  have 
in  these  United  States  a  system  of  Selective 
[158] 


The  Work  of  War  smiths 


Obedience.  Folks  pick  out  the  law  they  like 
and  obey  that.  I  'm  telling  them  why  I  passed 
the  Selective  Draft  so  they'll  understand  it, 
so  they'll  like  it,  so  they'll  get  behind  it  and 
push.  You  see  it  makes  every  fellow  equal, 
treats  'em  all  just  alike.  The  rich  man  and 
the  poor  man  stand  side  by  side,  each  of  them 
doing  a  man's  bit.  That's  good  solid  Ameri- 
can doctrine-,  it  goes  way  back  to  Magna 
Charta,  and  is  the  very  idea  we  are  fighting 
for.  Not  long  ago  a  young  French  officer  ex- 
plained to  me  that  universal  military  service 
is  the  very  essence  of  democracy.  The  prince 
and  the  peasant  rub  shoulders  in  the  ranks. 
The  millionaire  and  the  milkman  perform 
the  same  duties.  Wealth,  power,  political  or 
social  position — nothing  can  excuse  the 
slacker.  Each  must  serve  his  turn,  each  must 
do  his  bit.  The  very  essence  of  democracy, 
yes ;  the  prince  comes  to  realize  that  the  peas- 
ant lad  is  a  pretty  stalwart  sort;  while  the 
milkman  revises  his  prejudices  concerning 
the  millionaire,  who  endures  every  hardship 
and  faces  every  peril  without  complaint.  This 
[159] 


The  Unpopular  History  of  the  United  States 

democracy  of  ditch  digging,  this  f raternalism 
of  the  firing  line,  has  glorified  the  spirit  of  a 
rejuvenated  France.  Nobody  believed  that 
France  could  fight  as  she  has  done,  fought  at 
the  first  a  dogged  retreating,  step  by  step — 
then  forward  with  a  rush  and  her  old-time 
spirit.  Observant  men  assert  that  the  level- 
ing of  ranks  has  done  it. 

That's  just  the  way  our  folks  in  the  coun- 
try like  to  feel  about  the  public  service  and 
I  want  'em  to  know.  Believe  me,  I  trust  my 
folks — when  they  know. 


[160] 


THE  UNPOPULAR  HISTORY 

THIS  is  not  a  complete  history.  If  it  were 
more  complete  it  would  be  less  popular.  I 
know  that,  for  I  published  it  once  in  full,  for 
free  distribution,  and  I  could  not  get  anybody 
to  read  a  word. 

This  is  not  nearly  all  I  want  to  say.  I 
have  just  gone  over  the  rough  ground,  and 
occasionally  hit  the  high  places,  giving  you 
as  much  as  one  healthy  young  fellow  can  be- 
lieve— all  at  once.  The  fact  is,  I  did  not  be- 
lieve it  myself,  and  never  paid  a  bit  of  atten- 
tion to  General  Upton  when  he  first  wrote  his 
"Military  Policy  of  the  United  States.'  I 
never  caught  the  idea  that  we  had  a  Military 
Policy,  or  needed  one. 

General  Emory  Upton  was  a  West  Pointer, 
and  while  no  more  than  a  boy,  became  one  of 
the  most  distinguished  officers  in  our  Civil 
War.  Afterwards,  on  the  recommendation  of 
General  Sherman,  I  sent  him  to  study  the 
[161] 


The  Unpopular  History 


armies  of  Europe  and  Asia.  What  he  wrote 
in  the  year  1880  embodied  the  practical  les- 
sons of  the  Civil  War,  and  the  results  of  mili- 
tary science  throughout  the  world.  It  never 
touched  me.  Ifdid  not  even  print  his  book. 
His  manuscript  was  filed  and  forgotten 
amongst  the  millions  of  documents  in  the  ar- 
chives of  the  War  Department.  The  General 
printed  some  of  it  himself,  through  a  private 
publisher,  but  it  wouldn  't  sell. 

Nearly  25  years  later,  long  after  his  death, 
other  officers  investigated  the  subject  and 
made  me  realize  how  true  were  his  conclu- 
sions. Thereupon  I  published  ' l  Upton 's  Mil- 
itary Policy  of  the  United  States." 

Every  word  that  I  have  spoken  here  you 
will  find  in  there ;  it  has  my  official  endorse- 
ment, printed  on  my  presses,  franked  through 
my  mails,  and  sent  free  to  my  people. 

It's  true  as  gospel,  but  folks  say  it  doesn't 
taste  good. 

That's  why  I  call  these  few  brief  extracts 
from  Upton  "The  Unpopular  History^of  the 
United  States, "  by  Uncle  Sam  Himself. 
[162]  P 


Mi 


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